The Prevalent Practice of Kamaiya Bonded Child Labour in the Mid- and Far-Western Terai of Nepal by Purwaningrum, Maelenny
 The Prevalent Practice of Kamaiya Bonded Child 
Labour in the Mid- and Far-Western Terai of Nepal 
 
 
HUMR 5200 
Thesis in the Theory and Practice of Human Rights 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Oslo 
Faculty of Law 
 
 
 
Candidate number:8012 
Submission deadline:15 May 2012 
Word count:19,198 
 
15.05.2012 
 I 
 
 
 
“Verily, with the hardship, there is relieve” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For Sabita, Sima, and the Girls I met in Nepal  
 II
Abstract 
 
It was reported, in 2008, that there were more than 11,000 children working as kamaiya 
bonded child labour. Children who work in the kamaiya system perform domestic chores, 
take animals to pasture, collect grass/hay, and participate in other farm activities. Many of 
them work over twelve hours per day. The kamaiya system was commonly known as an 
agriculturally based bonded labour system which were pervasive among Tharu 
indigenous people in the mid- and far-western Terai of Nepal. In July 2000, the 
Government of Nepal made a landmark decision to outlaw the kamaiya system and issued 
the Bonded Labour Prohibition Act in 2002 which was intended to provide 
comprehensive regulation prohibiting bonded labour. However, in the mid- and far-
western Terai districts, children have been continuously affected by such practice.  
 
The fact that the practice of kamaiya bonded child labour in the mid and far-western Terai 
is still widely practiced a decade after the abolition of kamaiya system raises an essential 
question about what preserves the practice. This study is an attempt to understand the 
complex factors that contribute to the prevalent practice of kamaiya bonded child labour 
in the mid- and far-western Terai of Nepal. In doing so, I use qualitative approach. I 
analyse relevant legal and policy responses, and discuss socio-economic situation of 
freed-kamaiya households. I also conducted a brief field research to gain more insight 
about the socio-economic situation.  
 
The study reveals that although various legal and policy frameworkss with regard to the 
pertinent issue have been put in place, the implementation remains a big challenge. This 
may then affect the socio-economic dimensions. Moreover, the interplay of different 
factors such as poverty and household vulnerability; the elusive promise of education 
from the employers; and the widespread societal acceptance of such practice, have likely 
been preserving the kamaiya bonded child labour practice.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
 
1.1.1 Child Labour, Human Rights Issues and Modern Slavery 
 
Child labour is a contested concept. There are various discussions surrounding the 
conception of child labour, inter alia, the debate about “child labour” or “child work” 
term, the controversy over the definition of a child, the contention on whether or not 
working for family farm is regarded as child labour, and so forth. Some also argue that 
the relativity of childhood notions influenced the way a community perceives child labour 
(Veerman in Humbert, 2009: 14). There is no agreed opinion on what child labour is and 
how it should be tackled (Doftori, 2004: 49). 
Whilst the debates are still going on, there are a growing consensus that child 
labour involves mainly the questions of children working in early age, long working 
hours, hazardous working conditions and insufficient access, attendance or progress in 
school (Anker & Melkas in Doftori, 2004: 49). Child labour is considered as hazardous 
when it has adverse implications on children’s health, growth, psycho-social development 
and educational opportunities (UNICEF, 2007: 24 & ILO, 1999: 8). Child prostitution and 
bonded child labour are regarded as the most obvious examples of intolerable and 
exploitative forms of child labour by UNICEF (1997), and as unconditional worst forms 
of child labour by International Labour Organization (ILO) (2002).  
 ILO (2008) estimated that there is around 115 million children in hazardous work. 
The largest number is in Asia and the Pacific. However, the largest proportion of children 
in hazardous work relative to the overall number of children in the region is sub-Saharan 
Africa. The report also stated that 59 per cent of children in hazardous work aged 5–17 
are in agricultural sector, with 30 per cent in services and 11 per cent in industry.  
Child labour is a global concern. Since late 1980s, the international community 
has increasingly recognised the need for action to address child labour (Humbert, 2009: 
1). This was marked by different international initiatives, to name some of them, the 
adoption of the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in 
1989 which was then followed by the World Summit for Children in 1990; the 
2 
 
Programme of Action for the Elimination of the Exploitation of Child Labour in 19931; 
and the Special Session of UN General Assembly on A World Fit for Children in 2002.  
Unsurprisingly, after the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) was 
opened for signature in 1989, the language of children’s rights does start to enter child 
labour issues. (Cullen, 2007: 3). The main provision on child labour in CRC stipulates in 
the Article 32. It is also worth noting that Article 32(2)(b), unlike most child labour 
standards, requires that states also regulate the conditions of children’s employment. ILO 
Convention 138 (C 138) of 1973 was intended to be a universal treaty covering all child 
workers by continuing the labour regulation approach of the early conventions, setting 
minimum age for employment. However, it also creates three main categories of work 
(Cullen, 2007: 2). The first is the general category, for which the minimum age is at least 
15 or the school leaving age. The second is light work. Children over 13 (12 in 
developing countries) can work alongside education for a limited number of hours. The 
final category is hazardous work, where the minimum age is 18 (16 if adequate protective 
measures are provided). ILO Convention 182 (C 182) of 1999 follows the children’s 
rights approach of the CRC. Unlike the blanket abolitionist approach of C 138, C 182 
requires states to eliminate the worst forms of child labour, as enshrined in the article 3 
(Cullen, 2007:  4). 
Child labour issue shows the interrelatedness and interdependency of human 
rights (Arat, 2002: 14). These principles were emphasized by the Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action of 1993. The fulfilment of children’s rights depends on the 
realization of other human rights norms, for example, labour rights of their parents, right 
to education, and non-discrimination principle. In some other cases, it might also involve 
the protection of land rights, minority rights, and/or indigenous peoples’ rights. Moreover, 
the bonded child labour practice does not only violate the promotion and protection of 
children’s rights, but also denies child’s fundamental freedom, even amounts to slavery-
like practice or modern form of slavery.2 
Modern or contemporary slavery takes many forms, including sexual slavery, 
child slavery, chattel slavery, debt bondage, domestic servitude, contract slavery, reli-
                                                 
1UN Commission on Human Rights, Programme of Action for the Elimination of the Exploitation of Child 
Labour, forty-ninth session, 10 March 1993, E/CN.4/1993/79. 
2As stated by UN Human Rights Bodies, the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, as well as 
studies and the findings of special rapporteurs on pertinent issue, June 1991. 
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gious slavery and state slavery (Bales in Androff, 2010). Child slavery, in particular, can 
take the form of child soldiers, child domestic workers or sexual slavery. These forms of 
slavery have received significant attention in the media and the literature (Androff, 2010: 
213).  
Amongst all the forms of child slavery, I will focus on debt bondage and domestic 
servitude. Bonded labour is a slavery-like practice resulting from indebtedness (Cullen, 
2007: 17), usually in the form of forced agricultural labour (Ray in Androff, 2010: 214). 
The employer offers loans in exchange for labour, often that of the child or children of the 
debtor. These loans, which are often relatively small, are usually theoretically to be paid 
off by the work of the children (Tucker in Cullen, 2007: 17). A deceptive structure of 
debt, costs and low earnings preclude the chance for bonded labourers to exit from debt. 
This characterizes much of modern slavery in South Asia (Upadhyaya, 2004). 
Furthermore, in domestic servitude, children are being forced to serve as domestic 
workers in a household. They are held at force, isolated from the outside world, never 
allowed outside. They are strictly controlled within the households, and are forced by 
violence to provide service (Androff, 2010: 214). 
 Bonded child labour practice in the far and mid-western Terai of Nepal goes 
beyond the issue of child labour. It entails the incidence of child slavery that cross cuts 
various issues, such as, poverty, access to education, backwardness, lack of law 
enforcement, and marginalization. This study will be developed from the assumption that 
social exclusion and economic aspects are among the main factors that preserve the 
practice of kamaiya  bonded child labour in Nepal. 
  
1.1.2 Kamaiya Bonded Child Labour Practice in Nepal as a form of Modern Slavery 
 
Bonded labour issue is pervasive in the South Asian countries. It is among the 
oldest forms of forced labour that accounts for the greatest number of forced labourers in 
the contemporary world (CWA, 2007: 3). Around 15 million South Asian people, out of 
27 million globally, are reported in a bonded system (Bales in Giri, 2009: 1). The 
incidence of bonded labour often involves children. In Nepal, some forms of bonded child 
labour are extensively practiced, for example, in agricultural sector, brick kilns industry, 
carpet weaving industry, commercial sexual exploitation, and domestic work (CWA, 
2007: 23-24). The practices of bonded labour in Nepal include not only debt bondage but 
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also other forms of bondage which exist as forced, coercive and hazardous labour 
(GEFONT/ASI, 2007: 16). Overall, IPEC (2001) reported that 33,000 bonded child 
labourers were working in the country, while Child Workers in Nepal (CWIN) has placed 
the total number at 40,000 (CWIN, 2004: 103).  
One of the most well-known form of bonded child labour in Nepal is the kamaiya 
bonded child labour. Children working as kamaiya labourers may not be directly bonded, 
but they work in contexts that reflect the economic situation of their families and 
encompass elements of bonded labour relations (Sharma et al., 2001: 10). Children who 
work in the kamaiya system perform domestic chores, take animals to pasture, collect 
grass/hay, and participate in other farm activities. Their day can begin as early as 4 a.m. 
The majority stop work between 5 and 7 p.m., although some children reported working 
late into the night. Seventy percent of the child labourers, which were identified by ILO 
rapid assessment of kamaiya bonded child labour, work over twelve hours per day 
(Sharma et al., 2001: 7). Modes of payment to the child labourers vary between receiving 
food while at work as well as either food or cash to take home, or receiving food only, in 
some cases includes receiving cash in advance annually (Sharma et al., 2001; CWA, 
2007). 
Historically, the kamaiya system was commonly known as an agriculturally based 
bonded labour system which were pervasive among Tharu indigenous people in the mid- 
and far-western Terai of Nepal. The kamaiyas were obliged to provide underpaid and 
even unpaid farm labour for excessively long hours, under compulsion of the annual 
kamaiya contract – this can tie families into bondage for generations. There were around 
20,000 kamaiya households in the five Terai districts of Dang, Banke, Bardiya, Kailali 
and Kanchanpur (Sharma et al., 2001: 10). On July 2000, the Government of Nepal made 
a landmark decision to outlaw the kamaiya system, and issued Bonded Labour Prohibition 
Act, in 2002 which was intended to provide comprehensive regulation prohibiting bonded 
labour. However, in the mid- and far-western Terai districts, children have been 
continuously affected by such practice.  
It is argued that the condition for becoming a kamaiya ‘did not generally concern 
caste, colour, religion or tribe, but focused on weakness, gullibility and deprivation of 
people, making a direct relationship between labour bondage, wealth and abuse’ (Bales, 
2004: 11). According to Rankin (1999: 44; cf. Robertson and Mishra, 1997 in Giri, 2009), 
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the class convergence of Tharu and non-Tharu jamindar 
(landlords)was more significant than the shared ethnic identity of 
Tharu kamaiya and Tharu jamindar albeit Tharu landlords used to 
claim that they were better masters to their bonded workers than their 
non-Tharu counterparts. 
The kamaiya individuals may be used not just by landlords as bonded workers, but also 
by local politicians, moneylenders, rich city dwellers and by hoteliers as cheap labourers 
(Rankin, 1999; Sharma et al., 2001). 
In 2001, ILO-IPEC rapid assessment stated that fully 17,000 kamaiya children 
were bonded (Sharma et al., 2001). In 2006, a Nepali Times, a national newspaper, 
reported there were about 33,000 child bonded labourers under this system in 6 districts 
of mid- and far-western Terai (Nepali Times, 2006). Friends of Needy Children (FNC), 
an NGO which focus on bonded child labour issue, on the other hand, placed the number 
at 11,043 based on survey which was conducted in the above mentioned districts (FNC, 
2008). Moreover, in recent years, there has been an increase of bonded child domestic 
workers in urban areas which are originated from ex-kamaiya family who often find 
themselves in conditions of dire poverty (Lamichane in Giri, 2009).  
In many cases, the family offers their children’s labour in exchange for loan under 
annual agreement in times of family hardships. Children likely work for their parents’ 
former landlords or to a city dweller via a distant relative with the hope of contributing 
some household income (Giri, 2004). In 2001, ILO household survey outlined that 
majority of kamaiya children were employed within the villages, whereas 25.6 percent 
were employed outside the villages. It was also repeatedly reported that the majority of 
children working outside their villages were employed as domestic child labourers or in 
the informal service sector in urban areas of Nepal (Sharma et al., 2001). Indeed, Tharu 
children from the mid and far western Terai region made up a large percentage of 
domestic child labourers in the key urban areas of Nepal. In Kathmandu, fourteen percent 
of domestic child labourers were Tharus from this region (Sharma et al, 2001); in 
Pokhara, 24 percent of domestic child labourers were of Tharu origin (Sharma, 
Thakurathi and Sah, 1999). 
With regard to prohibition of child labour, the Government of Nepal has ratified 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, ILO Convention 138, and ILO Convention 
182. Domestically, besides forming a separate Ministry of Women, Children and Social 
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Welfare, the Children’s Act was introduced in 1992 to provide ‘a comprehensive national 
legal framework for the rights of the child’ (Nepal CRC Report, 2004). Furthermore, the 
Child Labour (Prohibition and Regularization) Act (1999) not only defines different types 
for work, but also prohibits the employment of children under the age of 16 in hazardous 
sectors (Nepal CRC Report, 2004). However, the enforcement and effective 
implementation of child labour laws are weak. The implementation of any rules and 
regulations is likely to clash with the diverse domestic values and norms concerning 
children and childhood. Nepal is the country where communal customs and familial 
interdependence play a significant part in the community which often precede national 
laws and the Government seems to have failed to take into account children’s duties and 
responsibilities towards their families when ratifying or accommodating international 
laws (Blanchet, 1996; Rankin, 1999 in Giri, 2009: 606). 
Nowadays, kamaiya children are also known as kamlahari. This practice cross 
cuts the elements of modern slavery. It entails the practice of bonded child labour as well 
as child domestic labour. In such conditions, children are denied full freedom to pursue 
their lives and their own development with dignity. They are forced to work for little or 
no wages, undermining their freedom as economic agents (Wiener, 2009: 139).  
 
1.2 Research Question and Objective 
 
The fact that the practice of kamaiya bonded child labour in the mid and far-western 
Terai is still widely practiced a decade after the abolition of kamaiya system raises the 
essential question about what preserves the practice. Hence, my research question is 
formulated as follow: “After the abolition of kamaiya bonded labour system in the year 
2000, why does the kamaiya bonded child labour practice prevail in the far- and mid-west 
Terai of Nepal?” 
The prevalent practice of kamaiya bonded child labour (kamaiya children) is the 
main issue in this study. I shall analyze the factors that contribute to the prevalence of 
such practice. It will not only discuss socio-economic factors, but also examine the legal 
enforcement and policy implementation related to the issue.  
The study is developed from the following hypothesis: 
Social exclusion and economic aspects are assumed to be the main factors that preserve 
the practice of kamaiya  bonded child labour in Nepal. 
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1.3 Methodology 
1.3.1  Research Method  
 
The research will mostly be conducted using qualitative approaches. In order to 
answer the research question, I will analyze legal and policy frameworkss and their 
implementations, as well as discussing the socio-economic aspects. I will be reviewing 
relevant official documents, various literatures and research. Moreover, I will also use 
interpretative approach in analyzing interview results from the field research. The 
information from field research is expected to give insight on the socio-economic 
situation and to complement statistical data. Brief field research was carried out between 
May and June 2011 in 7 villages in 3 districts (Dang, Bangke, and Bardiya districts) of 
mid- and far-western Terai, Nepal. The location were selected based on their 
accessability, resources availability, and severity of the issue in the area. During the field 
research, interviews and discussions were conducted, through individual talks as well as 
group discussions with freed kamaiya bonded child labourers, peers, teachers, and 
community leaders. During interviews and discussions, I was accompanied by a Nepali 
assistants. They assisted in practical matters, as well as with overcoming the language 
barrier by working as an interpreter. In addition, the interview with former kamaiya 
bonded child labourers aims at including children’s voice in this study.  
 
1.3.2  Theoretical Approach 
There is a growing understanding on the complex nature of child labour issue. It 
needs a comprehensive response that cuts across policy sectors (UCW, 2010). It is thus 
essential to look at the issue through a holistic analytical framework in order to 
understand the root causes. A simple model that fulfil this criteria was developed by 
Gilligan (2003, 32). This model consist of supply/push - demand/pull and micro - 
meso/macro factors and determinants of child labour (poverty, macro-economic, and 
sectoral policy integration; social protection; child labour policy framework; regulatory 
enforcement; societal acceptance of child labour; education as an alternative to child 
labour; gender-based discrimination; household vulnerability; and demand for child 
labour).  
The model will help to understand the interplay between the identified 
determinants of child labour. Supply/push factors push children into labour market, while 
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demand/pull factor create demand for child labour. Moreover, different level of 
determinants—macro, meso, micro—shows that some factors occur at the level of the 
individual child, family and community or individual enterprise, also national. The 
dichotomy is not intended to show absolute categorization but to understand the complex 
interaction among different factors. Some factors might fit into both categorization while 
others might fit only to one category. 
However, given my political science background and the nature of human rights 
study, I will mainly focus on discussing legal and policy frameworks and its impact to 
other factors.  
 
1.4  Terminology Clarification 
1.4.1  Child Labour 
 
 The definition of child labour which will be used in this study is based on the ILO 
Conventions and Recommendations on child labour, inter alia, ILO Convention No. 138 
on the minimum age for admission to employment and work, ILO Recommendation No. 
146, ILO Convention No. 182 on the worst forms of child labour, and ILO 
Recommendation No. 190. 
 
Table 1.1. Summary of the ILO Conventions on Child Labour 
                                                 
4Ditto. 
 The minimum 
age at which 
children can 
start work 
Possible 
exceptions for 
developing 
countries 
Hazardous work 
Any work which is likely to jeopardize children’s 
physical, mental or moral health, safety or morals 
18  
(16 under 
strict 
18  
(16 under strict 
conditions)4 
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(Source:  ILO Website, 2012) 
 
1.4.2  Bonded Child Labour 
 
 The term ‘bonded child labour’ which is used in this study is defined as, first, a 
child (younger than 18 years old, as defined by the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, 1989); second, working to pay a debt taken by him/herself or his/her 
family members or guardians, and/or working to meet any social obligations with or 
without his/her consent; third, under conditions that restrain his/her freedom and 
development, make him/her vulnerable to physical and other forms of abuse and deprive 
him/her of his/her rights (CWA, 2007: 3). Moreover, in the context of kamaiya system, 
children who work as kamaiya labourers may not be directly bonded, but work in contexts 
that reflect the economic situation of their families and encompass elements of bonded 
labour relations (Sharma et al., 2001: 10). 
In addition, this study will also take into consideration the nature of the work 
carried out by kamaiya children in relation to worst forms of child labour. According to 
                                                 
3Defined in  Article 3.3 of ILO Convention 138 and Paragraph 4 of ILO Recommendation 190: For types of 
work defined as hazardous, national laws or regulations or the competent authority may, after consultation 
with the organizations of employers and workers concerned, authorize employment or work as from the age 
of 16 years on condition that the health, safety and morals of the young persons concerned are fully 
protected and that the young persons have received adequate specific instruction or vocational training in 
the relevant branch of activity. 
5 If the country concerned has ratified ILO Convention 138 with this temporary derogation. 
6Ditto. 
should not be done by anyone under the age of 
18. 
conditions)3 
Basic minimum age 
The minimum age for work should not be below 
the age for finishing compulsory schooling, which 
is generally 15. 
15 145 
Light work 
Children between the ages of 13 and 15 may do 
light work, as long as it does not threaten their 
health and safety, or hinder their education or 
vocational orientation and training. 
13–15 12–146 
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the spirit of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child as that of ILO Conventions 
Nos. 29, 138 and 182, the worst form of domestic child employment exists if, (i) the child 
is sold, (ii) is bonded, (iii) works without pay, (iv)works excessive hours, (v), works in 
isolation or at night, (vi) is exposed to grave safety or health hazards, (vii) is abused, (viii) 
is at risk of physical violence or sexual harassment and, (ix) works at a very young age. 
The presence of any or a combination of these elements would render the work of 
kamaiya children one of the worst forms of child labour inNepal (Sharma et al., 2001: 
12).  
1.5 Structure of the Study 
 
 This study is divided into 5 chapters. Chapter 1 provides background, research 
question and objective, also methodology. Chapter 2 explains in greater detail the 
kamaiya system, its historical development. It also discusses the kamaiya bonded child 
labour practice in the present time through the lens of the rescued children. Chapter 3 
presents relevant legal and policy responses to the issue. Chapter 4 analyzes the legal and 
policy implementations and socio-economic dimensions. It also discusses findings from 
the field research. Chapter 5 presents concluding observations and remarks. 
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2. Overview of Kamaiya System 
The Nepali dictionary defines the word ‘kamaiya’ as “a hard tiller of land, a male or 
an obedient person, one who earns along with his/her family in other’s land by borrowing 
in cash or kind from the land owner or a peasant equivalent to him/her”(GEFONT/ASI, 
2007: 17). Similarly, according to the Tharu ethnic group’s dialect, in its local wisdom, 
the word 'kamaiya' originates from ‘kam’, which refers to ‘work’. In a Tharu parlance, the 
term is used as a synonym for hardworking hired farm labour (OMCT, 2006). However, 
the aforementioned definitions do not reflect the complete reality of the phenomenon. 
Karki (2001:70) addresses this when he defines the kamaiyas as “rural labourers forced to 
work by an existing socio-economic and political relationship in demeaning conditions, 
and used as virtually unpaid labour for the cultivation of land and other domestic 
activities.” The kamaiya system thus refers to the human power exploitation for 
agricultural and other related works (GEFONT/ASI, 2007: 17). 
In common practice, the kamaiya system does not only entail adult male labourer. 
His spouse is known as Bukrahi. She accompanies him in farm works. She is also 
responsible for domestic chores of the master. Kamaiya children, who generally work as 
animal herders, are known as Gaibar if they herd cattle. Those who herd buffalos are 
called Bhainsbar and those who take care of goats are called Chegar. Similarly, female 
children working as domestic servants of the landlords are known as Kamlahari (Sharma 
and Thakurathi 1998:1-3). On the surface, the kamaiya system is a contractual agreement 
for a year which begins at the Maghi festival (approximately on the 14th of January) 
between the landowner and an agricultural labourer, where labour is exchanged for 
payment in nominal cash or kind. Theoretically, at that time, both parties may agree or 
refuse to enter the contract. They both have the choice to make the agreement, but in 
practice bonded labourers do not have this freedom of choice. They are forced by social, 
economic, political and other compulsions to accept the agreement with any conditions 
dictated by their masters (OMCT, 2006; INSEC, 1992). The Kamaiya system also allows 
landlords to buy and sell one or more kamaiyas. The debt attached to a kamaiya passes on 
to his son and grandson in case of his death prior to the complete repayment of the loan 
(OMCT, 2006; Guneratne, 2002; Kvalbein, 2007; Lowe, 2001, Karki, 2001).  
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2.1 Historical Development 
2.1.1 Kamaiya System before 1950’s  
 
There is no agreement on the origin of kamaiya system. Many studies have traced 
it to the ‘sharecropping’ or ‘long-term farm labour’ practice in the South Asia during the 
Moghul empire (ca. 1500-1700 AD). A patron-client relationship between the landowner 
and the sharecroppers/farm labourers has been preserved since that era. (Lieten and 
Breman in Giri, 2009: 602; OMCT, 2006: 4). Some argue that labour arrangements 
involving a kamaiya as a yearly agricultural worker existed in the traditional Tharu 
society, but it did not take the form of lifetime bondedness prior to the 20th century 
(Lowe, 2001).  
As Rankin (1999) puts it, such traditional labour system involved a peasant 
cultivator (kisan) and a labourer (the kamaiya), whereby in exchange for the latter’s 
labour, the cultivator undertook to feed, clothe, and house him and his family. Kisans and 
their kamaiyas were traditionally linked by a shared ethnicity and often ties of kinship, 
and both participated in common moral economy. Relations between a kamaiya and his 
patron were often mediated by debt. The kamaiya was not necessarily landless; on 
occasion, a Tharu man entered into a kamaiya contract in order to obtain a loan. He was 
obliged to work for his master until the loan was repaid, but members of his family did 
not automatically become kamaiyas , and were free to work to raise the money to repay 
the loan. They were also opportunities for a kamaiya to repay his debt and end his 
kamaiya status (Rankin in Guneratne, 2002: 96).  
The traditional labour system was distorted by certain actions taken by the Nepali 
state. When present-day Nepal was founded in 1768 by absorbing dozens of small 
kingdoms or principalities, the practice of land grants as various forms of personal 
rewards started to become institutionalized. As a payment, reward or compensation, the 
monarchist governments offered large tracts of land to military officials, noble members 
or the defeated chiefs of the principalities (Rankin, 1999; Lowe, 2001). Those who 
received the land rented it out to tenants under adhiya and kut systems in which tenants 
would have to contribute at least half of their products to their landlords (Robertson and 
Mishra in Giri, 2009: 603). 
Particularly in the Terai region, appointed Tharu headmen, known as chaudhari 
(tax collectors) were granted domain over particular territories to extract agricultural 
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surpluses from the peasantry through revenue farming (Robertson and Mishra, 1997; Giri, 
2009). However, the use of chaudharis was gradually replaced by jamindars (landlords) 
‘as a means of extending a land-based system of patronage as well as expanding the areas 
of land under cultivation’ (Rankin, 1999: 34). Jamindars were increasingly drawn from 
high-caste Nepali-speaking people from the hills who had connection at court (Robertson 
and Mishra, 1997: 16). Certain jamindars were responsible for paying a certain amount of 
collected land tax to the government. Since jamindars had the authority to provide 
property ownership certificates, they used their administrative power for their personal 
benefit and gradually established their property ownership on wide areas of land through 
such practices, and become big landlords who provided a support base for the Rana 
regime (Karki, 2001: 7). 
In addition, large tracts of land in the Terai were given away by the King as 
rewards to favoured courtiers or generals to ensure their loyalty to the Crown (Robertson 
and Mishra, 1997: 16). The land granted in this way called birta land and the recipients 
called birtawalas. They had power to collect revenue from the Tharu people who worked 
the land and in return they paid tribute to the Crown. This system was operated during the 
Shah kings and then later the Ranas. In 1952 this system accounted for about 700.000 
hectares of land or 36 per cent of the total cultivable area of Nepal (Robertson and 
Mishra, 1997: 34) 
When Jang Bahadur Rana came to power in mid-19th century, he started a family-
based oligarchy system, and sought an active policy to isolate Nepal from external 
influence. By doing so, the extended Rana families could enjoy the extravagant lifestyle 
from the land tax revenue (Rankin, 1999). During Jang Bahadur and his family’s 104-
year-long reign, the land grant system and taxation rights were consolidated, leading to 
‘the “process of feudalisation” of agrarian relations and strengthening the private 
landowners’ economic capacity by diverting revenue away from the state treasury’ (Karki 
in Giri, 2004). 
For a long time, this policy was essential to satisfy the local chiefs, warrior class 
and to finance the war with Tibet and British India (Rankin, 1999). When the 
expansionary drive of Nepali rulers was halted by British India in 1818, the whole land 
policy was geared towards extracting revenues for the ruling elites while allowing 
landlords to reign freely in the villages (Lowe, 2001). This feudal system rendered 
extensive powers to landowner over the peasants who cultivated their lands and were able 
14 
 
to set whatever levels of rent suited them. The villagers living on their land had the status 
of serf and the landlords could demand unpaid labour and other services from them 
(Robertson and Mishra, 1997: 35). 
Revenue collection policies during late 19th and the early 20th century had 
created a new landlord class —jamindar and birtawal— very unlike the peasant 
cultivators (kisan) who had provided a livelihood and a degree of security to their 
kamaiyas (Rankin in Guneratne, 2002: 96-97). The introduction of jamindar and the 
granting of birta lands showed an expansion of the farmed area of the Teraiand depletion 
of the Tharu’s traditional forest lands. The growing number of landless Tharu who were 
used as labour to clear this land and make wider cultivation possible (Robertson and 
Mishra, 1997: 16). 
Until the first half of the 20th century, it is further argued, Nepal’s most productive 
and sought after agricultural land lying in the Terai region was still rather sparsely 
cultivated (Rankin, 1999). Because of a malaria epidemic, hill people were unable to 
settle on a large scale in the region inhabited by the indigenous Tharu community, who 
could tolerate tropical diseases and wild animals all year round (Rankin, 1999). The 
collapse of Rana regime in 1950s was followed by malaria eradication programme 
supported by the World Health Organization (WHO). It subsequently led to mass 
migration from the adjacent hills (Robertson and Mishra, 1997: 16). Powerful landed 
families from the hills were able to increase their holdings in the newly opened forests 
and further marginalise the Tharu, which has been living in the Terai for the last 600 
years. Although a small portion of Tharu became landlord themselves, and adopted the 
ways of the majority high-caste society, the vast majority of the Tharu were left in an 
increasingly vulnerable position and ripe for exploitation (Robertson and Mishra, 1997: 
17). 
 
 
2.1.2 Kamaiya System after 1950’s 
 
There is some evidence to suggest that the kamaiya system developed initially 
from a survival strategy used by the Tharu people to help insure against the risk of 
sedentary farming. Over the years, the hill–Terai migration not only displaced the Tharu 
people, but also drastically changed the demographic and ecological settings, not to 
mention converted the system into a highly exploitative one (Robertson and Mishra, 
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1997: 17). In fact, the Tharu people who are thought to be the first inhabitants of Terai 
region, were the first group of people to start falling into the system of debt bondage 
(Rankin, 1999). In 1912, for instance, the great majority of landowners in the mid- and 
far-western Terai area were believed to be Tharu people, but by the late 1960s, some 80 
percent of the Tharu people were tenants, and 90 per cent of the landlords they worked for 
were mostly settlers from the hills (Lowe, 2001).  
Given the widespread disparity in the land ownership, the King, with pressure 
from donor agencies, introduced Land Reform Act in 1964 (Robertson and Mishra, 1997: 
35). In the beginning, it was thought that a revolutionary policy would positively reduce 
economic inequalities in rural areas, particularly in the Terai region. The Act had some 
success in protecting the rights of the tenant farmers, but the large landholders continued 
to take advantage of several loopholes in the law (Robertson and Mishra, 1997). The 
jamindars reportedly made a clever move to transfer the rights of their land to their 
extended family members in order to free themselves from the control of land reform 
policy. For instance, only 1 per cent of 600,000 hectares of land reserved for 
redistribution was distributed, and no more than 300,000 farmers received tenancy rights 
certificates out of 1.8 million eligible (Robertson and Mishra, 1997). In 1966, the 
jamindar system itself was abolished but its power structure, so firmly established over 
the centuries, continues even today (Giri, 2004). As a result, within a few generations, 
around ten thousands of Tharu peasants became kamaiya workers cultivating other 
people’s land; women became bukrahi (or helper) and children worked as kamlahari 
(maids or domestic workers) until they were old enough to take over their parents’ work 
(Lowe, 2001). 
According to Sharma and Thakurathi (1998:12) very little was known about the 
socio-economic conditions of kamaiyas at the national level. INSEC (1992:86) claims 
that, in fact, not all kamaiyas were bonded labour. They could be classified into two 
categories; kamaiya with saunki (debt) and kamaiya without saunki. The kamaiyas with 
saunki were more vulnerable than kamaiyas without saunki. This was because they could 
be bought and sold for the saunki by their masters whereas in some cases kamaiyas 
without saunki might have at least the freedom of choosing their masters at the Maghi 
festival. Another classification was whether the kamaiya owned his own house or patch of 
land on which it was built. The most exploitative cases occurred when the kamaiya was 
both in debt and without land of his own, which in such case he was obliged to live on the 
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landlord’s property (Robertson and Mishra, 1997: 19). However, researchers argue that 
both types of kamaiyas were forced to work as bonded labour by the socio-economic 
conditions of their society and family. This was because no matter whether they had 
saunki or not, once they came into contractual agreement with their landlords they fell 
into a vicious circle of bonded labour system which had been providing bare subsistence 
for generations (OMCT, 2006: 4). 
In most cases, the debt owed by a kamaiya was relatively small, below NR 2,000 
(US$36.00), but with no cash income, it was virtually impossible to repay. The debt was 
inherited and passed down from father to son (Robertson and Mishra, 1997: 19). The 
kamaiya system allowed the selling and buying of one person to another. The kamaiya, 
thus, represented a tangible asset which the landlord could sell to others. These 
transactions were often carried out between landlords during the traditional time of the 
Maghi Festival  (Robertson and Mishra, 1997: 18). The debt increased to pay for 
medicine, additional food and any other necessities. Often the landlords inflated the debt 
still further and charged the kamaiya for any day’s work which they missed through 
sickness or any damages to a piece of equipment or domestic animal for which the 
kamaiya was held responsible was added to the debts, often without the kamaiya’s 
knowledge (Robertson and Mishra, 1997: 18). 
The wage or remuneration for the kamaiya was too low to meet the need for a 
square meal for a family, around 9 to 12 sacks of rice, a sack being equivalent to 75 
kilograms. Consequently, a kamaiya was compelled to borrow from the landlord to cover 
expenses for food, medical expenses, social obligations, and other unusual circumstances. 
These additional borrowings added to the debt (GEFONT/ASI, 2002: 18). The kamaiyas 
were usually given a payment in rice after the harvest; this payment was known as bigha. 
In addition they were given a portion of other grains, salt and oil, again handed over in 
one lump sum to supplement the rice (Robertson and Mishra, 1997: 18). The total amount 
was gauged to be just enough for survival and sometimes slightly less. Besides, the 
kamaiyas were often forced to borrow food and money to deal with socio-cultural 
obligations from the master. Once they borrowed money and food grain from the 
landlords, the kamaiyas fell into the trap of a debt-bonded labour system (ILO, 1995: 14).  
In practice, most kamaiyas did not have freedom of choice. They were forced for 
various reasons to accept the terms and conditions dictated by their masters (OMCT, 
2006: 9). The kamaiyas did all the ploughing and heavy field work. They usually worked 
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for a 12-hour continuous period receiving meals in the field. During harvest and 
ploughing periods, however, they often continued through the night working 20-hour per 
day for weeks at a time. In the off-season they were either given work or were loaned or 
hired out to their landlord’s friends or relatives (Robertson and Mishra, 1997: 20). They 
were not free to work for wage labour elsewhere. Landlords used verbal threats and 
humiliation to intimidate the kamaiyas. Although the kamaiyas were reluctant to report 
physical abuse, it is clear that violence was also used (Robertson and Mishra, 1997; 
Lowe, 2001). 
 
 
2.1.3 The Movement against Kamaiya System, the Abolition in 2000 and the  
Aftermath 
 
The movement against the kamaiya system intensified in 1990 (OMCT, 2006: 13). 
One of the factors stimulating a concerted kamaiya movement is the restoration of multi-
party democracy and the open political environment that existed in the country after 1990. 
The kamaiyas managed to get external support from NGOs, IGOs and some political 
parties (OMCT, 2006: 27). The kamaiya movement before the 1990s can be seen as 
amorphous, poorly organised, and spontaneous collective behaviour and action (Karki 
2001:123). However, there were series of sporadic resistances and uprisings in the region 
before 1990 as well. Most of them were localised and isolated from the broader 
movements for socio-economic and political transformation (OMCT, 2006: 13). Most of 
these movements met a tragic end suppressed by government forces with the support of 
local ruling elites and feudal (OMCT, 2006: 27) 
Until 1990, none of the state-led land and reform policies and programmes 
considered the kamaiyas as a potential target group, evident by the fact that they were 
never be the beneficiaries of the Land Tenancy Rights, Landless People Resettlement 
Programmes and the like (Karki, 2001: 74). The Government of Nepal acknowledged the 
existence of the kamaiya bonded labour system only in 1995 (GEFONT/ASI, 2007: 37). 
By accepting the kamaiya system as a bonded labour system in 1995, the Ministry of 
Land Reform and Management of Nepal prepared a household list of 15,152 kamaiya 
families from five districts in 1996 (GEFONT/ASI, 2007: 37). This census was heavily 
criticized by NGOs, claiming that the figures underestimated the number of kamaiyas 
(OMCT, 2006: 5; Kvalbein, 2007: 60). It then was revised to 18,400 in the year 2000 
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(GEFONT/ASI, 2007: 37). However, not much was done by the government at that time 
to rehabilitate the kamaiyas. Consecutively, different entities continued to pressure the 
government to end the system. 
Karki (2001) classifies the movement against the kamaiya system into three broad 
categories, they are, movement from within, movement from above, and culmination of 
both movement within and above. The movement from within was marked by various 
resistances and strikes by the kamaiya families which scattered all over mid- and far-
western Terai. This movement was small in its size, highly localised, and lacks support. 
The movement from above entailed a wide range of campaigns against the kamaiya 
system and interventions to address the kamaiya problem, conducted by national and 
international agencies. These agencies advocated for an open national governance system, 
influence national policies, mobilised financial resources both at the national and 
international level (for example bilateral and multi-lateral donors) and government 
departments which could help the kamaiyas. The culmination of the movement happened 
in 2000. Intense and prolonged pressure from the kamaiyas, national and international 
human rights groups, civil society actors and others finally led the Nepalese parliament to 
declare the system of kamaiya illegal and all kamaiya were to be liberated (Upadhyaya, 
2008: 25). All previous contracts between kamaiya and their landlords were declared null 
and void, and debts cancelled (GEFONT, 2007: 31). 
Immediately after the government declaration of the kamaiya liberation, the 
government formed a national committee to deal with problems associated with the 
kamaiyas at the central level and sub-committees in kamaiya-majority districts to identify 
and rehabilitate the liberated ex-kamaiyas (GEFONT, 2007: 37-38). The committee then 
updated a survey of kamaiya households, which was taken in 1995 (Kvalbein, 2007: 60). 
The ex-kamaiya households were grouped under four categories in light of the possession 
of huts and land (OMCT, 2006: 25). 
 
Table 2.1. Categorisation of Ex-Kamaiyas by the Government of Nepal in 2000 
Group Category Total 
Household 
Card Type 
A Homeless and landless families  8022 Red 
B Families with a house and a small plot 5428 Blue 
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of unregistered land 
C Families with a house and a plot of 
registered land of up to 2 kattha 
1877 Yellow  
D Families with a house and more than 
2 kattha of registered land 
3073 White 
 Note: 30 kattha = 1 ha. = 1.5 bigha 
(Source: Ministry of Land Reform and Management (MoLRM) in GEFONT, 2007; 
OMCT, 2006) 
 
The government promised to give up to five kattha of land to landless kamaiyas of 
category A and to register the land for kamaiyas of category B. Distribution of land had 
taken place, but there were many still waiting while living in temporary camps (Kvalbein, 
2007: 60). Many liberated kamaiyas, particularly those who were homeless and landless, 
spent months in filthy camps, facing difficulties coupled with sickness and lack of bare 
necessities (GEFONT, 2007: 43).  
The slow response to rehabilitate liberated kamaiyas was seen by many observers 
as the lack of ability— or a political will — of the government (OMCT, 2006: 24). The 
movement then took a different turn from February 2001. According to Kathmandu Post 
on 4 February 2001, at least 7,000 kamaiyas forcibly occupied public land including the 
land owned by the Cotton Development Committee (CDC) of the government in Bardiya. 
However, more than 300 riot police cordoned off the area forcing the ex-kamaiyas to 
leave. Soon after the ex-kamaiyas were chased away, the riot police set fire to their huts 
and the CDC tractors destroyed the crops they had planted to make sure that the ex-
kamaiyas would not dare to occupy the land again (Kathmandu Post, 4 February 2001 in 
OMCT, 2006: 25).  
In 2002, the government undertook another round of registration for ex-kamaiya 
after being criticised that many ex-kamaiyas were left out in previous census. In June 
2002, Nepal’s Ministry of Land Reform and Management released a new data of ex-
kamaiya households.  
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Table. 2.2. Distribution of Ex-Kamaiya Households as of June 2002 
District Category A Category B Category C Category D Total 
Dang 302 403 397 324 1,426 
Banke 1,118 803 135 260 2,316 
Bardiya 6,469 5,082 1,115 1,833 14,499 
Kailali 3,758 5,217 189 598 9,762 
Kanchanpur 3,923 495 33 55 4,506 
Total 15,570 12,000 1,869 3,070 32,509 
Source: MoLRM, 2009 in Buddhi Ram, 2011: 74 
 
Also in 2002, the Kamaiya Labour (Prohibition) Act, prohibiting some kamaiya 
forms of bonded labour was finally adopted. Prior to the Act, courts were reluctant to take 
action on bonded labour, despite some recognition that it existed. However, since 2002, 
no one has been prosecuted for the use of bonded labour (Upadhyaya, 2008: 27). The Act 
does not provide mandatory rehabilitation and some parts of the act, such as monitoring 
through national and district level committees, have not yet been implemented 
(Upadhyaya, 2008: 22). 
The rehabilitation process has been beset by widespread anomalies. As of 
February 2003, 7,801 labourers had received three to five katthas of land while 2,986 had 
received less than three katthas of land7 (Upadhyaya, 2008: 23). It was found that many 
kamaiyas have got land certificates, but no land at all8 (OMCT, 2006: 25). 
Moreover, the Ministry of Land Reform and Management coordinated a 
programme with NGOs and government agencies to rehabilitate kamaiyas, to allocate 
land, to distribute timber for house construction and to provide vocational training. 
Timber for house construction was given to 161 families, and over 7,900 families 
received the government’s housing grant of Rs 8,000 (approximately US $107), provided 
to all ex-kamaiyas identified as landless. The Kamaiya Labour (Prohibition) Act 2002 
provided that, upon completion of housing construction, the government would provide 
an additional grant of Rs 2000 (approximately US $27) for income generating activities, 
                                                 
7The Nepal Ministry of Land Reform estimates that a minimum of three katthas of land is required for one 
family’s subsistence. 
8According to news commentary published in the Nepal Samacharpatra of 18 September 2004, of the 
868 Kamaiya families residing in a captured airport in Kailali, 104 have had land certificates, but not 
land. Also see, Lamichhane 2003:90  
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which included chicken, goat or pig farming. As of December 2004, in Kailali district 
only 74 out of 2,436 households had received the money for income-generating activities 
(Upadhyaya, 2008: 23). 
Although widely hailed as one of the most progressive decisions of the 
governments formed in the 1990s, it was made without proper arrangements for housing, 
food security and other arrangements required for rehabilitation (OMCT, 2006: 24).The 
biggest challenge to the government and IGOs, and NGOs involved in the campaign 
against the kamaiya system was to create an environment in which alternative rural 
livelihoods could be ensured. Weaknesses in the rehabilitation phase, including the length 
of time between release and the receipt of rehabilitation and the fact that bonded labourers 
were released without empowerment support, has left former kamaiyas vulnerable to 
entering into new forms of exploitative working practices including bonded labour 
(Upadhyaya, 2008: 24). Some have reportedly entered into exploitative share-cropping 
arrangements while others have pledged the free labour of their children for access to 
tenancy (GEFONT, 2007: 42). 
Despite the release of large numbers of kamaiya bonded labourers, measures taken 
by the government have been undermined by poor coordination between government 
departments, corruption, and a lack of policy coherence (GEFONT in Upadhyaya, 2008: 
24). Rehabilitation efforts have not reached all released kamaiyas. Though the 
government  targeted to distribute the land to all ex-kamaiyas by the end of June 2009, 
based on a survey conducted by Districts of Land Reform and Management, in 2009 there 
were still around 6,922 kamaiya households (25%) who did not receive land which had 
been promised more than a decade after their freedom.  
Table 2.3. Land Distribution to Ex-Kamaiya (as of 15 June 2009) 
District Eligible HHs to 
receive land 
Total 
Rehabilitated HH 
HHs haven’t 
received land 
Dang 705 705 - 
Banke 1,921 1,921 - 
Bardiya 11,551 7,451 4,100 
Kailali 8,975 6,153 2,822 
Kanchanpur 4,418 4,418  
Total 27,570 20,651 6,922 (25%) 
 Source: DoLRM, 2009 in Buddhi Ram, 2011: 76 
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However, there were also many positive results. Labourers who did receive 
adequate land and support for houses around urban centres, were able to obtain a degree 
of economic autonomy, raising chickens and goats and producing vegetables for sale and 
were able to send their children to school. The level of literacy has increased among the 
released kamaiyas, the numbers of children attending school have also reportedly 
increased, as has access to health care and access to clean water (GEFONT, 2007; 
Upadhyaya, 2008). 
 
2.2 Kamaiya Bonded Child Labour 
 
2.2.1 Kamaiya Children before Liberation 
 
In the kamaiya system, it was common for children from a kamaiya family to also 
work for the same landlords as their parents. Girls generally worked as domestic servants 
while boys looked after the livestock as animal herders. Working for the master amounted 
to apprenticeship training for children, it ensured that they became effective kamaiyas as 
they grew older. There were about 13,000 children working under the kamaiya system in 
the five districts (Sharma and Thakurathi 1998). A large proportion of them was unaware 
of any wage payments system and did not get paid at all. They were not paid either due to 
debt incurred by the parents, or because their work was appended to the adult family 
labours, or they simply worked in exchange of food and clothing. The division of labour 
among the kamaiyas depended upon the age and sex of the kamaiyas (OMCT, 2006: 8). 
 Children at the age of 15 were considered fully active economically. Karki (2001) 
illustrates the division of labour and life cycle of kamaiyas in the following diagram 
developed in the light of his intensive interaction with the local people during fieldwork 
in Bardiya in 2001. 
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Diagram 2.1. Division of Labour by Gender and Life Cycle in the Kamaiya System 
 
(Source Karki, 2001: 80) 
 
As shown in the diagram, a person entered into the cycle of bondage as Ladkakhelaiya 
as young as 5-9 years old while taking care of masters' children, who were normally 
younger than Ladkakhelaiya. As they grew, the assignment continued to change. At ten 
years of age, they became a Bhaiswar or a Gaiwar. At around 15 years of age, they were 
given responsibilities of taking care of oxen and other farm responsibilities. The role took 
on other forms when a Kamaiya grew older, generally until 50 years of age, they were 
assigned to take care of plants at the homestead and were called a Badheruwa. 
Sometimes, older Kamaiyas were also assigned to take care of cattle and buffaloes,. They 
were also called Gaiwar and Bhaiswar. Similarly, these older Kamaiyas (both males and 
female) who took care of their masters' children were  called Ladkakhilaiyas. 
 
2.2.2 Kamaiya Children After  Liberation 
 
A year after liberation, many ex-kamaiya children were still working for their 
landlords or in roadside tea-shops and hotels in the bazaars and bigger cities (Lowe, 2001: 
24 
 
5). The children of kamaiyas were still used as collateral for loans taken by their parents, 
or were still required to work for the same employers as their parents under exploitative 
sharecropping arrangements. (ILO-IPEC, 2001: 10). The number of children working in 
these arrangements may, perversely, actually have increased since the freedom 
declaration (Lowe, 2001: 5). 
It was repeatedly reported that the majority of children working outside their 
villages are employed as domestic child labourers or in the informal service sector in 
urban areas of Nepal. Indeed, Tharu children from the mid and far western region do 
make up a large percentage of domestic child labourers in the key urban areas of Nepal 
(ILO-IPEC, 2001: 18). In Kathmandu, 14 % of domestic child labourers are Tharus from 
the region; in Pokhara, 24 % of domestic child labourers were of Tharu origin (Sharma et 
al 2001 and Sharma, Thakurathi and Sah 1999 in ILO-IPEC, 2001: 18).  
There is no official record on the total number of kamaiya bonded child labour. 
Most of the available data are based on sample survey and estimation. In 2001, ILO rapid 
assessment estimated the total number of kamaiya bonded child labourers in the mid and 
far western Terai reached 17,000 children whowork either in or outside the village in 
which their families reside. With more than 30 %  of the total kamaiya population aged 5 
to 18 working away from their households (ILO-IPEC, 2001: 23). In 2004, Child Workers 
in Nepal (CWIN) placed the total number at 40,000 (CWIN, 2004). In any case, studies 
indicate that most bonded child labourers come from large, landless families and that 
most of them are working in agriculture or as child domestic workers (CWA, 2007: 23). 
Some NGOs which focus on rescuing kamlaharis have conducted informal 
surveys on their own. Society Welfare Action Nepal (SWAN), a local NGO, estimated a 
national figure of 20,000 to 25,000 from the five Tharu districts of mid and far western 
Terai. (Nepali Times, 2006). Furthermore, Friends of Needy Children (FNC) estimated 
11,043 kamlaharis in six districts in mid and far western Terai (FNC, 2008). 
The tasks performed by the kamaiya children are highly gender specific. A 
majority of girls working inside the household and a vast majority of boys engaged in 
farm work outside the household. Girls employed as domestic worker are popularly 
known as ‘kamlahari’. Most kamlaharis are working as domestic child labour, looking 
after children (ladkakhelauna) or engaged in domestic chores. A small proportion of them 
is also engaged in agricultural work outside the household, particularly required in the 
peak farm seasons of planting and harvesting. On the other hand, boys are mainly 
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engaged in farm work and/or animal grazing and are popularly known as‘chhegar’ (goat), 
‘gaibar’ (cattle), and ‘bhainsbar’ (buffalo) (ILO-IPEC, 2001: 25). 
Most of kamaiya children work excessive hours. Their days can begin as early as 
4 a.m. and stop work between 5 and 7 p.m. although some children reported working late 
into the night. Around one in five children sampled in the ILO-IPEC assessment said that 
they started working before reaching their 10th birthday (ILO-IPEC, 2001: 8 & 29). For 
example a 13-year-old ex-kamlahari informed me: 
 
I worked as a kamlahari when I was 6 years old. I used to do all the household 
work. Master used to give only food and clothes (Sushi). 
 
Another ex-kamlahari added: 
I used to clean dishes, wash clothes and other house holdwork. I went to bed at 11 
p.m and had to get up early in the morning at 4 o'clock (Yama). 
 
Children in this arrangement are also prone to mistreatment. Many cases have 
shown that kamaiya children are vulnerable to abuse, physically and psychologically. 
Generally, scolding or shouting is taken as a normal part of life, be it at home or at work, 
but many seem to feel humiliated when they are slapped, or worse, badly beaten. On top 
of scolding and slapping some girl workers face sexual mistreatment from their 
employers or from some predators in the neighbourhood. (Giri, 2010: 163). A 18-year-old 
ex-kamlahari shares her experience: 
Being a kamlahari was very burdensome for me. If I didn’t wash the clothes clean 
enough for my master, then I had to do it again. If the dishes were not clean then 
my master would beat me. When I wanted to visit my family at home, my master 
didn’t allow me to. Due to my family poor economic condition I was forced to live 
my life as kamlahari. (Ara) 
There are wide range of remuneration types received by the kamaiya children. 
IPEC documented the remuneration types in the Table 2.4. A large share of the kamaiya 
wage child labourers work without pay. Many are not paid because their parents are 
engaged in sharecropping contracts, or because the wages of children are implicitly 
included in parents' wages. For those who are paid, the wages are meagre. 
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Table 2.4. Mode of Remuneration of Kamaiya Children 
(Source: ILO/IPEC, 2001) 
 
In the ILO rapid assessment, the annual wage of kamaiya bonded child labour was 
in the range of two to three quintal of rice per annum, which amounts to an annual wage 
of Rs. 1,000 to 2,000 (ILO/IPEC, 2001: 28). Whereas Buddhi Ram (2011) found that 
some children who work fulltime received Rs. 1,000-1,500 per month and Rs. 4,000 per 
annum for those who work and received education support. However, in the recent times, 
the promise of education has  become a magnet for the kisan (and maybe also for parents) 
to make an annual contract that does not really benefit many or most kamaiya children. 
They are either not allowed to attend school at all or are given so much work that they 
eventually have to drop any ambitions of becoming educated (Giri, 2010: 161). 
 There are different experiences regarding promise of schooling, a 16-year-old ex-
kamlahari explains her ability to combine education and work:   
I used to work as kamlahari in Kathmandu. I started to work since I was 8 years 
old, for 8 years. My masters treated me well and sent me to school. I used to have 
time for studying at home. But, I wasn't paid for my work. (Suni) 
 
However, another ex-kamlahari has a different story: 
In order to pay for my parents’ loan to the master, they sent me to work at 
master’s house. My mother asked me to go to master’s house but I refused. I said I 
want to go to school and my master promised me to send me to school but in the 
end he never sent me to school. He also gave me a lot of work. (Gane, 16)  
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ILO (2001) points out that the incidence of bonded child labour in the mid and far 
western Terai reflects the level of social discrimination, poverty and exploitation that the 
ex-kamaiyas and their children are facing (ILO-IPEC, 2001: 17). Child labour problem 
among children of the kamaiyas seems mainly due to large family size and landlessness. 
Almost two-thirds of households supplying child labour are landless, and from almost 
half of these households, more than two children are reported working (ILO-IPEC, 2001: 
23). In an agricultural society, landlessness inevitably results in ensuing and deepening 
poverty (ILO-IPEC, 2001: 37).  
 ILO (2001) also explains three interrelated aspects of bondage in the kamaiya 
bonded child labour practice. First, debt-bondage occurs when parents of child labourers 
have taken loan from their employer. Generally, children cannot be withdrawn from work 
until the loans are fully repaid, and the child works in debt-bondage to pay off parental 
debts. Second, the result of one or both of the parents seeking employment from a 
landowner. In this case, children usually work along with their parents for the same 
employer. Third, bondage also ensues with kamaiya households leasing land from 
landowners. To continue leasing contracts, landowners require the kamaiya family to 
supply child labour. The phenomenon of linking land leasing and child labour is 
increasing, especially since the liberation of kamaiyas in July 2000. Although it was not 
possible to collect primary or even proxy information on the extent of this phenomenon, 
there is indication that burden of the land lease-child labour linkage seems to be high 
among kamaiya girls (kamlaharis) (ILO-IPEC, 2001: 36). 
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3. National Responses to Kamaiya Bonded Child Labour Issue 
 
As highlighted in the inter-agency report of the Hague Global Child Labour 
Conference in May 2010, the complex phenomenon of child labour needs a 
comprehensive response. This response cuts across policy boundaries, which includes, 
schooling, health care, labour market conditions, enforcement of core labour standard and 
legislation, social protection, basic services access, income distribution, social norms, and 
cultural practices. This chapter explains different national and international commitments 
made by Government of Nepal with regard to kamaiya bonded child labour issue, as well 
as various policy responses and institutional mechanisms.  
 
3.1 Legislative Framework 
3.1.1 Relevant Legislations on the Abolition of Kamaiya System 
 
Internationally, Nepal has ratified various international human rights conventions 
that commits itself against exploitative forms of labour, among others. Nepal is a 
signatory to the Slavery Convention and its Supplementary Convention on the Abolition 
of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery. As a state 
party to this Convention, Nepal has assumed the obligation to take all practical and 
necessary legislative and other measures to bring about progressive abolition or 
abandonment of institutions and practices relating to slavery and slave trade including 
debt bondage and serfdom (GEFONT/ASI, 2007: 33). Nepal is also a member state of 
ILO, and, as such, is bound to honour, incorporate and implement letters and spirit of ILO 
conventions, particularly the Forced Labour Conventions No. 29 and 105.  
Nepal Constitution (1990) outlaws the practice of forced or bonded labour. The 
current Interim Constitution of Nepal (2007) adds additional vigour to the spirit of the 
previous constitution, articles 29 and 30 provide a number of provisions prohibiting 
forced and bonded labour and regulating other labour practices (Interim Constitution of 
Nepal, 2007; GEFONT/ASI, 2007). Similarly, the Kamaiya Labour (Prohibition) Act, 
(2002) was enacted after the abolition of the kamaiya system to provide a legal back up to 
the freed of kamaiyas. In addition, the Civil Rights Act, 1956 and the Civil Code, 1964 
also have provisions both banning and/or regulating certain forms of labour practices. 
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Kamaiya Labour (Prohibition) Act (2002)defined the term kamaiya as those who 
provide kamaiya labours ‘bhaiswar’, ‘gaibar’, ‘bardikar’, ‘chhegarbar’, 
‘haruwa’,‘charuwa’, ‘hali’, ‘haliya’, ‘gothala’, ‘kamlariya’, ‘bukrahi’or under other 
similar systems. Key provisions in the Kamaiya Act include the following (Kamaiya Act, 
2002): first, persons working as kamaiya workers at the time of the commencement of 
this Act shall be freed;second, no person shall keep kamaiya labourer after the enactment 
of this Act; third, kamaiya workers need not repay the saunki; fourth, bond or agreement 
(written or verbal) relating to the kamaiya loan shall be cancelled; fifth, any property 
obtained by the creditor as a mortgage/security while supplying kamaiya loans must be 
returned to the concerned person within three months from the date of enactment of this 
Act; sixth, a defaulter should pay a fine ranging between NRs15,000 to NRs 25,000 to the 
government. He should also pay a worker double the amount of minimum wages fixed 
under this Act for each day of compulsory or forced work. Those who fail to return 
mortgaged property shall pay a fine of NRs 10 to15 thousand along with the property. 
Those who employ a person without pay or with a pay lower than the minimum wage 
shall pay a fine of NRs 1 to 3 thousand and double the amount of the minimum wage for 
each day of work to the worker concerned. In the case of a person holding a public post, 
the amount of penalty will be double the normal one. The same is applicable to a defaulter 
who acts in contravention of the Act more than once. 
The single aim of the Kamaiya Act is to eliminate the kamaiya system. Focusing 
only on the kamaiya system, it however does not address other forms of exploitative 
labour that are akin to kamaiya labour (GEFONT/ASI, 2007; Upadhyaya, 2008). The 
Kamaiya Act is also weak in terms of holding the perpetrator to account. Combination of 
dominant higher class influence, and insufficiency of administrative and legal 
mechanisms is likely to be the reason. Some might argue that this is why most of policy-
makers, high level bureaucrats and some political leaders have not discontinued 
maintaining kamaiyas in one way or another (GEFONT/ASI, 2007; Upadhyaya, 2008). In 
other words, the Kamaiya Act has failed to hit the class interest of these categories of 
people. The failure in implementation is also caused by insufficiency of administrative 
and legal mechanisms. 
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3.1.2  Relevant Legislations on the Elimination of Child Labour  
 
Nepal has made a number of important legal commitments to the protection and 
advancement of the interests of child workers.Nepal ratified the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child in 1990, ILO Convention No. 138 (Minimum Age) in 1998, and 
Recommendations No. 146; ILO Convention No. 182 (Worst Forms) in 2002 and 
Recommendations No. 190.9  Nepal also signatory of the SAARC’s Colombo Resolution 
on Children, the Declaration of the Rawalpindi Ministerial Meeting on Children 
(Abolition of child labour), Male Summit (SAARC Decade of the Rights of the Child), 
Convention on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Women and Children for 
Prostitution, and the Convention on Regional Arrangements for the Promotion of Child 
Welfare in South Asia. (UCW, 2003: 34; Gilligan, 2003: 48)  
The Constitution of Nepal (1990) seeks to protect the interest of children by 
conferring on them certain fundamental rights. Article 20 of the Constitution prohibits 
traffic in human beings, slavery, serfdom or forced labour in any form, and also prohibits 
the employment of minors in factories, mines or any other hazardous worksite. Article 26 
obliges the state to protect the rights and interests of children, and to protect them from 
exploitation (Gilligan, 2003: 49). The Children’s Act (1992) and Labour Act (1992), 
enacted in pursuance of the constitutional mandate, make the employment of children 
below the age of 14 years illegal. The Children’s Act also established conditions of 
employment and provides for the establishment of a Central Child Welfare Board and 75 
District Child Welfare Boards. Businesses employing children 14 years and over must 
register the child with the District Child Welfare Board (Gilligan, 2003: 49). The Child 
Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, endorsed by both houses of parliament in 2000, 
makes important amendments to the Labour Act (1992), listing specific occupations as 
hazardous and prohibiting the use of children below 16 years of age in these occupations 
(UCW, 2003: 34).  
In 2000 the government raised the minimum age for hazardous work, which was 
set at 14 in 1992,10 to 16, by adopting the “Child Labour (Prohibition and Regularization) 
                                                 
9Nepal is also signatory of UN Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and International Covenant of Civil and 
and Political Rights (1966) 
10Children’s Act (1992), Chapter 2, Section 17(a) and Labour Act (1992), Chapter 2, Section 5(1) 
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Act.11 This act prohibits children below 16 years from employment in risky occupations 
including public transportation, construction, tourism-related activities, and industries 
such as carpet weaving, cigarette, cement, etc, which involve contact with chemicals and 
thus harmful to children’s health. It regulates that children below 16 years are not allowed 
to work before 6am and after 6pm, that they may not engage in work exceeding six hours 
per day and thirty-six hours per week, and that they must have one day’s leave per week, 
and half-an-hour rest every day after every three-hour work period (de Groot, 2010: 12). 
The Act provides heavier penalties for violations (Gilligan, 2003: 49). Penalties for 
violating the law include imprisonment (USDOL, 2010: 545).12 
 
Table 3.1  Summary of Major Provisions against Bonded Child Labour in Nepali 
Law 
Laws/Acts Year Provision 
Interim Constitution of 
Nepal  
2007 Right against exploitation; right against 
human trafficking, slavery or bonded 
labour and forced labour; right to proper 
work practices; and right to trade unions, 
among other civil, political, social and 
economic rights 
Kamaiya Labour 
(Prohibition) Act 2002 
2002 Freedom of all kamaiyas with the 
cancellation of saunki and nullification of 
bond or agreement; return of mortgage/ 
security; and punishment for maintaining 
kamaiyas 
Child Labour(Prohibition 
and 
Regulation) Act 
2000 Restriction on Child Labour 
Public Prosecution Act  1992 Human trafficking cases are dealt with as 
a public offence 
Labour Act 1992 Fixation of working hours and minimum 
wages; overtime payment, layoff, health 
                                                 
11Child Labour (Prohibition and Regularization) Act (2000), Chapter 2, Section 3(2) and Schedule 
12Child Labor (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, No. 14, (2000), chapter 1, section 2(b) 
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and safety; and other welfare and social 
security measures 
Children’sAct 1992 Protection of children’s rights and interest 
Trade Union Act  1992 Right to organisation and 
collectivebargaining 
The Constitution of 
Kingdom of Nepal 
1990 Right to organisation; recognitionof labour 
force as a main social andeconomic 
strength; protection of labourrights; 
prohibition of all forms of forcedlabour; 
and restriction on employment ofminors in 
hazardous works, including 
anycontraventions punishable by law 
Traffic in Human (Control) 
Act 
1986 Definition of human trafficking as a crime, 
punishment to defaulters 
Muluki Ain (Civil Code) 1964 Provision against the practice of forced 
labour; restriction on enslavement; 
fixation of wages by mutual agreement; 
and compensation to the worker in case of 
non payment 
Civil Rights Act 1956 Right to equality; right 
againstdiscrimination; right to personal 
liberty;right to life; right against forced 
labourand prohibition of child labour 
 
 
3.2  Relevant Policy Responses to the Kamaiya Bonded Child LabourIssue 
 
 Nepal has been involved in the follow up of the ratification of ILO C182 in 2002. 
ILO/IPEC implemented the Time-Bound Programme (TBP) in order to assist the country 
in implementing the Convention by identifying the worst forms of child labour and 
developing specific plans for their eradication. It led to seven sectors being identified as a 
worst form of child labour that should be eliminated (ILO/IPEC 2006), which include, 
domestic labour, porting, bonded labour, trafficking (for sexual or labour exploitation), 
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rag picking, carpet sector, mining and stone quarries. Since then, the child labour issue 
has also been raised in the Government’s Development Plans and attempts have been 
made to formulate strategies (de Groot, 2010: 12-13). 
In the National Planning Commission’s Tenth Plan (2002-2007) the objective was 
to eliminate “most of the worst forms of child labour existing in various sectors in 
Nepal”, and that “provision will be made to eliminate the worst forms of child labour 
within next five years and all forms of child labour within next 10 years” (Nepal National 
Planning Commission, 2002). Based on the fundamental idea that future manpower would 
be unproductive if children are deprived of education and good nourishment, the Plan 
envisaged that programmes related to the elimination of child labour should be integrated 
with poverty alleviation programmes. The capacity of employees of concerned ministries, 
departments and offices related to the implementation of programmes aimed at child 
labour elimination should be enhanced, and a high level Central Coordination Committee 
should be constituted in order to coordinate the programme related to child labour 
elimination. With regard to freed-kamaiya issue in particular, the Plan sets out several 
main steps which will be taken by the government, first, provision will be made to 
provide the access of means to the marginalized class to increase the employment 
opportunity, second, programmes will be launched for uplifting those emancipated after 
the abolition of kamaiya practices through skills development programme, third, 
arranging for the proper rehabilitation of the freed kamaiyas, fourth, protection of land 
ownership and increasing the access of the real agricultural labourers to farmland (Nepal 
National Planning Commission, 2002). 
In 2007 the Government concluded that “the legal, policy, institutional and 
operational efforts to protect and promote child rights continue to be ineffective” and thus 
proposed the implementation of policies “to create a favourable environment for the 
control of child labour of all types and eliminate worst forms of child labour on priority 
basis” in the Three-Year Interim Plan (2007-2010). According to this Plan “necessary 
legal, policy and institutional arrangements will be put in place and responsibility and 
awareness of the family will be increased in order to realize the goal” (Nepal National 
Planning Commission, 2007). Rehabilitation, resettlement, and livelihood development 
programme for freed-kamaiyas are still widely proposed (Nepal National Planning 
Commission, 2007). 
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In line with other policy documents, the tenth Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
also proposes measures to protect children from illegal recruitment and to strengthen 
inspection mechanisms, in order to gradually eliminate child labour through improving 
school quality and access, raising enrolment rates, increasing literacy rate and promoting 
technical and vocational education (GoN, 2002). Nepal’s National Master Plan on Child 
Labour 2004-2014 defines child labour as “work or activity carried by children below the 
ages as defined by the constitution of the country and as explained in the Children Act 
and Labour Act” (MoLTM, 2004a: 2). It calls for eliminating the worst forms of child 
labour by 2009 and all forms of child labour by 201413. The Master Plan commits Nepal 
to improving existing rules and regulations on child labour and links the elimination of 
child labour to improvements in the accessibility and quality of schooling (UCW, 2003b: 
35). The government is currently in the process of revising this plan, and has published 
preliminary results in its draft National Master Plan on the Prevention and Elimination of 
Child Labour 2011–2020. The draft national plan adjusts the Government’s timetable. 
Under this draft plan the goal is to eliminate the worst forms of child labour by 2016 and 
eliminate all forms of child labour by 2020 (USDOL, 2010a: 546). 
In the education sector, the law guarantees the right to free primary education for 
children between the ages of 6 and 12, however, education is not compulsory in Nepal,  
(Nepal National Planning Commission, 2007 and USDOL, 2010b). Besides free primary 
education, the Government also plans to make primary education compulsory (Shiwakoti 
et al.in Ringdal, 2011: 60). The Compulsory Primary Education programme in Nepal 
aims to reach all part of the country by 2015 and to make schooling compulsory by law 
by 2012 so that children between 5 and 10 years old must complete five years of 
education (Shiwakoti et al in Ringdal, 2011: 60). However, in practice, the costs of 
teacher fees, books and uniforms are prohibitive for many families, and some children are 
not sent to school (USDOL, 2010a: 545). 
Moreover, the Government’s School Sector Reform Plan aims to expand access to 
education and to provide alternative schooling and non-formal education to vulnerable 
populations. Out-of-school children (which include child labourers) are the primary 
beneficiaries identified in the plan (Ministry of Education, 2009). The Interim Three-Year 
                                                 
13Ministry of Labor and Transport Management, National Master Plan on Child Labor, 2004-2014, 
Kathmandu, 2004,10. 
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Plan addresses hazardous child labour through a social awareness and reintegration 
campaign. It expands education opportunities to working children and provides skills 
training to youth older than 14 who may be especially vulnerable (US Embassy, 2011). 
The Government is currently revising the interim plan and expects the new interim plan 
will also include a goal of eliminating child labour (USDOL, 2010a: 547) 
The Government of Nepal relies largely on donor funding for programmes to 
address child labour (USDOL, 2010: 547). There are a wide range of group involved in 
this efforts. According to the first comprehensive analysis of child labour related 
programmes in Nepal, each year a total of US$62.6 million are allocated to the 
implementation of 29 international donor agency (multilateral, bilateral or international 
NGO) programmes directly or indirectly relate to the issue of child labour (ILO-IPEC, 
2001b).  Allocations to core child labour programmes (i.e., child labour, trafficking or 
bonded labour), however, are much less – an estimated US$18.3 million annually. In 
addition, it is estimated that about 240 NGOs with a stated objective of helping children 
are registered throughout the country. Community development and community-based 
organisations, university and research institutions, and the media are also active partners 
and important stakeholders in addressing child labour (UCW, 2003: 35).  
In addressing bonded child labour, the Government participated in a USDOL-
funded project to assist former bonded child labourers and their families from 1 
September 2006 - 15 December 2010 (USDOL, 2010: 547). The project took a multi-
dimensional and comprehensive approach to addressing the problem at hand, it addressed 
withdrawal of children, providing education, vocational and skills training, employment 
for families and unionization. It brought together multiple stakeholders including 
government, NGOs, trade unions, employers’ organizations, community organizations. 
This project successfully withdrew 1,821 children from bonded labour, increased school 
enrolment rates, provided families with training for generating on farm employment. The 
project also provided technical assistance to the Government in drafting its Master Plan 
on bonded labour. However, evaluation of this project also has raised questions about post 
project support and long term sustainability (ILO, 2010).  
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3.3  Institutional Mechanism for Coordination and Enforcement 
 
The Ministry of Labour and Transport Management (MoLTM) is officially leading the 
responsibility of enforcing child labour legislation. MoLTM leads the National Steering 
Committee on child labour eradication which comprises of other government departments 
(USDOL, 2010). MoLTM is the primary national agency responsible for enforcing child 
labor laws. MoLTM’s Department of Labor is responsible for the labor inspectorate 
nationwide. MoLTM is responsible for enforcing laws that prohibit bonded labor laws in 
agriculture (USDOL, 2010).  
In addition, a Central Child Welfare Board (CCWB) has been set up in order to 
protect and ensure children’s rights. On a district level, the CCWB works through the 
District Child Welfare Boards (DCWBs), which are officially set up in all 75 districts, but 
often in practice comprise only one person (who is in many cases also concerned with 
other duties) (de Groot, 2010: 15). District Child Welfare Boards (DCWBs) have limited 
legal authority to enforce child labor laws and may issue civil fines. These DCWBs are 
the entities that receive complaints of forced child labor violations. However, the 
Government maintains no data on the number of cases reported (USDOL, 2010). Both the 
CCWB and the DCWBs are part of the Ministry of Women, Children, and Social 
Welfare. In practice, both MoLTM and the CCWB (under the MOWCSF) are provided 
with insufficient resources (in terms of both finances and manpower) that would enable 
them to fulfil their responsibilities. Besides, the unstable political situation in Nepal is 
another obstacle to implementation of existing child labour laws (de Groot, 2010: 15). 
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4. Analyses and Findings 
4.1 Analyses and Findings of the Legal Enforcement and Policy Implementation  
 
4.1.1 Legal Enforcement 
 
 A solid legal framework is a fundamental basis for action. It is highly unlikely that 
the problem of bonded labour and child labour can be tackled without adequate 
legislation. In order to build a solid legislative framework on the pertinent issues, Nepal 
has been actively committing itself to various international legal instruments. A wide 
range of legal commitments related to bonded labour and child labour issues (see Chapter 
3) have been incorporated into national legislation. However, the incorporation has left 
some shortcomings that hinder the legislation to be effectively enforced.  
 With regard to child labour issue, there are many contributions that a solid 
legislative framework offers to efforts against child labour; inter alia, it translates the 
aims and principles of international standards into national law; it sets the principles, 
objectives and priorities for national action to combat child labour, and especially its 
worst forms; it establishes the machinery for carrying out that action; it offers a clear 
definition of child labour to be abolished; it sets forth specific rights and responsibilities; 
it provides sanctions for violators; it provides legal redress for victims; it articulates and 
formalizes the State’s duty to protect its children; it creates a common understanding 
among all the actors involved; it provides a yardstick for gathering statistics and 
evaluating performance; and it provides a basis and procedure for complaints and 
investigations (UCW, 2010). Scrutinizing child labour legislation of Nepal, one may 
easily point out a considerable amount of contradictions and inconsistencies. This can be 
a major obstacle for the implementation.  
Concerns regarding inconsistencies and contradictions in the child labour 
legislation of Nepal have been addressed by various literatures and reports (For 
discussion see Gilligan, 2003; UCW, 2003; ILO-IPEC, 2001b; USDOL, 2010). However, 
little has been done by the Government to address these concerns. Having in mind various 
child labour legislations depicted in the chapter 3, the shortcomings are quite striking. Of 
most concern, the new Child Labour Act (2000) does not cover family-based work, or, 
inter alia, work in private homes, in agriculture and on tea estates. By the same token, 
The Labour Act (1992) with its focus on the registered enterprise, has no jurisdiction on 
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all unregistered enterprises and business entities of less than ten employees, where most 
child labourers are situated. This creates a conclusion that children hired outside formal 
arrangements are not covered by the Act. Children who work in the informal sector – 
which account for the majority of Nepali child workers – are therefore not illegal, even if 
the children in question are below the minimum working age of 14 specified in the Act. 
This loophole may hamper the effort in addressing kamaiya bonded child labour issue, as 
most of the children are founded to be working in the informal sector, for example in the 
private houses and agricultural sites. 
Moreover, there is contradiction between the Children’s Act and the Labour Act 
on the definition of a “child” and the minimum age for entry to hazardous work. By 
setting the minimum age for entrance to hazardous work at 16 years, the Child Labour 
Act is not in line with ILO Convention No. 138 (Minimum Age), which states that a 
person must be at least 18 years of age before entering into hazardous work.14 It thus fails 
to protect children ages 16 and 17 from work that could jeopardize their health and safety. 
In addition, hazardous work is not defined nor is there a mechanism for having a form of 
work declared hazardous (Gilligan, 2003: 51). Also, these laws on the age of legal 
hazardous work are not in line with international commitments in ILO No.182. 
Strengthening this definition and adjusting the age limit would help to protect kamaiya 
children between the age 16 and 17 who work in the harmful environment. 
As for the Kamaiya Act (2002), the main issue of this Act is that it solely target 
the kamaiya system without addressing other types of bonded labour relations that exist. 
It is thus difficult for the act to be used to protect those who work under other types of 
exploitative bonded labour system in Nepal. Moreover, the Act does not provide for 
mandatory rehabilitation of the freed-kamaiyas.  
In Nepal, legislation seems to be an expression of aspiration rather than consent. 
Law enforcement has been a major challenge in this country. In the context of child 
labour law, the institutional mechanism for enforcing the law is weak. Labour inspectors 
are limited in number and investigative powers, meaning that worksite visits are rare and 
inadequately followed up. District Child Welfare Boards, which has mandate to protect 
and ensure children’s rights in each district, have no inspection powers and most do not 
                                                 
14This concern was raised in ILO-IPEC, Supporting the Time-Bound Programme in Nepal, IPEC Core TBP 
Project, A technical co-operation programme funded by the United States Department of Labour, Project 
document, 2001. 
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yet exist (Gilligan, 2003: 51). Inspection in the formal sector is facing many obstacles, let 
alone the informal sector. Private houses and agricultural sites, where many kamaiya 
children work, are highly unlikely to be monitored. In this case, the work of NGOs and 
labour unions is essential. 
Weak monitoring system also applies when it comes to the enforcement of 
Kamaiya Act. Although it is outlined in the Act, monitoring through national and district 
level committees have not been implemented. Moreover, no system of effective 
identification has been established (Upadhyaya, 2008: 22). It is evident from the 
unreliable record and registration process of freed-kamaiyas. It thus impedes the 
implementation of freed-kamaiyas’ rehabilitation programme. 
Enforcement of child labour and kamaiya legislation has also been hindered by the 
weakness of Nepal’s judiciary system. Prior to the Kamaiya Act in 2002, courts were 
reluctant to take action on bonded labour, despite some recognition that it existed. Since 
2002, no one has been prosecuted for the use of bonded labour (Upadhyaya, 2008: 24). 
As regard to kamaiya bonded child labour practice, there is not enough information 
mentioning judicial prosecution of such case. However, penalties for illegal employment 
of children are small and seldom applied (Gilligan, 2003: 51).  In addition, kamlahari 
practice, a type of bonded child labour practice among the kamaiya children, has been 
banned by the Supreme Court of Nepal in September 2006. Whilst this ban,  the practice 
still prevails, in particular in the mid and far western Terai region (UNICEF, 2009). 
It is also important to point out that legal enforcement highly depends on the 
societal acceptance. Successful regulatory enforcement is based upon the strength of the 
policy and its legal instruments, clarity of authorities, availability of resources, and, most 
importantly, societal acceptance. Enforcing regulations that criminalize large numbers of 
people who do not accept the moral authority of a policy will lead to its failure (Gilligan, 
2003). Therefore, analysing social acceptance of kamaiya bonded child labour practice is 
essential to better understand the issue. It will be discussed in the following section. 
Amidst the loopholes, the ban of kamaiya bonded labour practice which was 
enacted into Kamaiya Act has been successfully emancipating a large number of 
kamaiyas. As the government claims that approximately more than 18,400 kamaiyas in 
the mid and far-west Nepal have been liberated (GEFONT in Upadhyaya, 2008: 23). 
However, rehabilitation of the freed-kamaiyas, which has taken more than a decade, is 
still facing many obstacles.  
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4.1.2 Policy Implementation 
  
As mentioned elsewhere, child labour is a complex phenomenon. Addressing 
child labour requires a policy response that is cross-sectoral in nature and that involves 
actors both inside and outside government. After having built on adequate legal 
framework, it is then necessary to develop a comprehensive response, including, 
education, social protection, labour markets, and strategic communication and advocacy 
(UCW, 2010). Child labour has been mainstreamed in national  development plans of 
Nepal. The Poverty Reduction Strategy 10th Plan, Interim Plan, and National Master Plan 
on Child Labour have set strategies to eliminate child labour (See section 3.2). 
Furthermore, the Master Plan has also identified the existence of kamaiya bonded child 
labour practice as a form of slavery/forced labour and prioritized its eradication as part of 
worst forms of child labour.  
The Plans can be seen as containing quite comprehensive policy responses. They 
address the issue of child labour in relation to education, aiming to improve school quality 
and access, to raise enrolment rates, to increase literacy rate and to promote technical and 
vocational education. They also acknowledge the need to build a strong social protection 
and healthy labour markets to address child labour issue.15 Having said that, the enormous 
number of child labourers in Nepal today implies different reality in practice. 
Implementing the plans seems to be a huge challenge for the government. This was 
admitted by the government in 2007 that the legal, policy, institutional and operational 
efforts to protect and promote child rights continue to be ineffective (Nepal National 
Planning Commission, 2007). It was then followed by adjusting the timeline for 
elimination of worst forms of child labour from 2009 to 2016 (USDOL, 2010: 546).  
A study (ILO-IPEC, 2002a) on child labour related programmes in Nepal 
highlights two major constraints in the policy implementation. First, child labour 
programmes are concentrated in districts with road access rather than where need is 
greatest. In an attempt to map the geographical distribution of child labour-related 
programmes in Nepal, ILO-IPEC collected information on the activities by district of 
these 29 different international donor agency programmes (including multilateral, 
bilateral, and INGOs). The mapping exercise revealed a very weak relation between the 
                                                 
15The strategies are explained in the National Master Plan on Prevention and Elimination of Child Labour 
2004-2014 
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distribution of child labour programmes and child labour rates. Indeed, districts that were 
found not to be covered by any of the 29 programmes were among the poorest and most 
remote, where children face of the highest risk of involvement in work. Instead, the 
programmes were found to focus their efforts on districts with road access. Second, 
although collaboration in this field has been improving, nonetheless, it remains a major 
challenge. 
Furthermore, a decade long Maoist insurgency has become an essential 
impediment for policy implementation. The insurgency, which occurred between 
February 1996  and April 2006, was launched by the CPN (Maoist) against the 
government. The conflict resulted in death of at least 13,000 people and the destruction of 
physical infrastructure, displacement of people, and serious disruption to the economy 
(UN Country Team of Nepal, 2010: 3).  
Household vulnerability is one of the main factor that push children into labour 
(Gilligan, 2003: 60). Improving household resistance towards socio-economic challenges 
is therefore very important. Improving freed-kamaiyas household resistance through 
strengthening kamaiya rehabilitation programme will likely contribute to address kamaiya 
bonded child labour issue. Kamaiya rehabilitation programme has also been featured in 
many policy documents of Nepal. However, it has been very slow in the implementation. 
Many freed-kamaiyas are still left out from the rehabilitation programme a decade after 
their emancipation (see chapter 2). Despite the release of large numbers of kamaiya 
bonded labourers, measures taken by the government have been undermined by poor 
coordination between government departments, corruption, and a lack of policy 
coherence (GEFONT in Upadhyaya, 2008: 24). 
In addressing bonded child labour, the Government participated in donor funded 
project to assist former bonded child labourers and their families from 1 September 2006 
- 15 December 2010 as part of ILO-IPEC programme. This project claims that it has 
successfully withdrawn 1.821 children from bonded labour, increased school enrolment 
rates, provided families with training for generating on farm employment. The project 
also provided technical assistance to the Government in drafting its Master Plan on 
bonded labour. However, evaluation of this project also has raised questions about post 
project support and long term sustainability (ILO, 2010). Thorough assessment regarding 
freed-kamaiyas livelihood situation is necessary to monitor the impact of interventions 
and to determine the further steps in addressing the issue.  
42 
 
4.2 Analyses and Findings of the Socio-Economic Factors 
4.2.1 Poverty and Household Vulnerability 
 
The relation between child labour and poverty has been discussed in many 
literatures. Poverty is regarded as the cause as well as the result of child labour (more 
discussion see, Doftori, 2008; de Groot, 2010; UCW, 2010). This section will examine 
poverty situation in Nepal, in the mid and far-western Terai in particular; and analyse how 
it affects household vulnerability of freed-kamaiya households or vice versa. Then, I will 
discuss how the situation influences freed-kamaiya families’ decision to resort to child 
labour. 
 
4.2.1.1 Poverty and Inequality 
 
In general, Nepal belongs into the category of Least Developed Countries (UNDP 
2011). Nepal’s Gross National Income per capita (PPP) is 1,160 USD, with HDI value 
0.458 that ranked Nepal 157 out of 187 countries in the 2011 Human Development 
Report. According to MDG progress report, macro-economic indicators of Nepal, 
especially over the last two years, show serious weaknesses. The balance-of-payments 
deficit continues, with weak fiscal discipline, and an unfavourable investment 
environment. All these combined indicate a weak economy (World Bank, 2010: 6). 
Amidst the challenging economic situations, progress in several areas has been 
achieved. One of them is on poverty reduction. Between 1996 and 2004, the level of 
poverty was reduced from 42 per cent to 31 percent and, it has continued going down 
from 31 per cent to 25.4 per cent between 2005 and 2009 (World Bank, 2010: 4). 
However, within this positive trend, high disparity across the region, gender and social 
groups is a persistent problem. The 2009 assessment highlights that 95.5 per cent of poor 
people live in rural areas and the incidence of poverty in rural areas (28.5 per cent) is 
almost four times higher than that in urban areas (7.6 per cent) (CBS 2009). In addition, 
the gap between rich and poor is unacceptably high and is also increasing.  
Widespread disparity implies that the development does not reach the most 
vulnerable groups of people in Nepal. Freed-kamaiyas may likely be one of them. UNDP 
(2009) outlines that the people of three higher level caste and ethnic groups—Madhesi 
Brahman and Chhetri, Newar and Hill Brahman—have a higher HDI value—than that of 
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Janajatis,16 both from the Hills and the Terai. Being Tharus andbelonging to janajatis 
group, freed-kamaiyas are left out from development in comparison to the higher castes. 
Moreover, freed-kamaiyas, who mainly work as agricultural labourers and sharecroppers, 
will likely to shrink deeper into poverty, as UNDP (2009) points out that poverty is 
highest among agriculture wage labourers, followed by small farmers who cultivate their 
own land.  
The unfavourable condition has hindered many people in disadvantaged situation 
to escape from poverty. Freed-kamaiyas are not only burdened by the slow progress of 
rehabilitation process,  but also hampered by the unfavourable condition that makes them 
more vulnerable to exploitation, not to mention to recourse to child labour.  
While huge discrepancy and poverty might widen the possibility for freed-
kamaiya families to send their children to work, singling out poverty as the cause does not 
give a clear picture of the complex nature of kamaiya bonded child labour issue. 
Considering that not every poor household resort to child labour, one need to deeper 
analyse the reason behind freed-kamaiya households sending their children to work. The 
next section will look at former kamaiya households’ resistance towards economic and 
social shocks. 
 
4.2.1.2 Household Vulnerability 
 
 Household vulnerability makes and keeps households poor, deprived of 
opportunities and marginalized, and is supplier of children to the market (Gilligan, 2003: 
60). Vulnerable households are not capable of absorbing unpredictable economic, social, 
and physical shocks as the result of unstable economic condition in Nepal.  
 After liberation in 2000, freed-kamaiyas faced many difficulties. The 
rehabilitation programme meets various impediments and has been very slow in uplifting 
their livelihoods (see chapter 2). Until recently, there are still around 6,922 freed-
kamaiyas that haven’t been rehabilitated (MoLRM in Buddhi Ram, 2011). 
Soon after the liberation, freed-kamaiyas had to immediately find other occupation 
to survive. Many of them found it was very difficult as they had very limited options and 
                                                 
16Janajatis is a term in the caste system of Nepal which consists of indigenous groups. Tharu ethnic is also 
categorized in this caste group. Janajatis group is placed in the lower-middle of the caste system and is 
regarded as impure but touchable.  
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job seeking skills. Based on random sampling of freed-kamaiya households, Kvalbein 
(2007) divides freed-kamaiyas occupation into two groups (Kvalbein, 2007):  
those who are employed in a sharecropping arrangement and those who work 
as casual labourers, either in the urban or the rural areas. Casual worker bases 
their income on revenues from an unpredictable market for casual labour, 
whereas 41% of the respondents are employed as sharecroppers. Contrary to 
the fixed income given to kamaiyas, sharecropping implies that the income 
risk is equally shared by the tenant and the landowner. Thus, a sharecropper 
has to face a risky income. One of the reason to choose this type of contract is 
that they are less risk averse than those who prefer casual work and may also 
take advantage of the opportunity to do casual work whenever they are not 
busy working as sharecroppers. In addition, programme intervention from the 
government has given former kamaiyas more skills and easier access to better 
paid jobs in the cities. 
 
It is unclear as to whether freed-kamaiyas earn better income in comparison to the 
situation when they were kamaiyas. Income may vary from one household to another, it 
may depend on their skills and access to job market. However, household subsistence 
seems to be a big problem. Sample household survey in Banke and Bardiya districts by 
Buddhi Ram (2011) shows that food shortage condition of freed-kamaiya householdsis 
very critical. In Bardiya and Banke districts, respectively 90 % and 98 % of former 
kamaiya households are in a condition of food shortage. 
Furthermore, landlessness is one of the main factors behind household 
vulnerability in Nepal. To lessen the vulnerability of freed-kamaiyas, the government 
distributes lands as part of the rehabilitation programme. Until June 2009, around 20,651 
ex-kamaiyas have received land (DoLRM in Buddhi Ram, 2011). Distributed land size is 
varied from 1-5 kattha. It is also quite contradictory to Ministry of Land Reform’s 
estimation about family subsistence that each family minimum needs three katthas of land 
(Upadhyaya, 2008: 23). Many of the distributed lands are only sufficient to build house 
and kitchen gardening. Moreover, land distribution for around 6,000 ex-kamaiyas are 
halted because of land shortage (Kathmandu Post, 2011). 
 Homeless ex-kamaiyas have also received housing support from the government. 
Around 10,000 Nepali Rupees and 32 cubic feet timber were supplied to individual 
household. In the end of June 2009, nearly 43 % households received cash support and 19 
% of them received timber support (MoLRM in Buddhi Ram, 2011). However, many still 
live in small and poor condition temporary houses or huts, let alone access to basic 
facilities, for example, electricity, water, and healthcare. (Buddhi Ram, 2011). Describing 
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the effect of vulnerable households on the children in the surrounding households, a 
teacher in Kachnapur, Banke district, said: 
Children’s condition in this area is very miserable. Due to poverty, they usually 
work during day time (e.g. carrying loads, pulling rickshaw) or work in the city 
(nepalgunj) in order to buy foods. (Rama Paudel) 
It is worth mentioning that correlation between child labour and landlessness in 
Nepal is high. ILO rapid assessments (2001) on child labour in Nepal reported that 50 % 
of children who were interviewed come from landless families. Household without land 
possession has limited ability to cope with and be more vulnerable to economic shocks. It 
is thus worth noting that the situation of landlessness and small land possession 
experienced by freed-kamaiya households may likely be a factor for kamaiya children to 
be bonded labourers. As a 16-year-old ex-bonded labour girl put it: 
In order to pay my parents’ loan, they sent me to work at master’s house. My 
mother asked me to go to master’s house to work. I was working hard and had a 
lot of work. 
Given the long period of working as kamaiya without exposure to education, 
freed-kamaiyas were also known as uneducated and backward. A study of kamaiyas by 
Sharma & Thakurathi (1998) which was conducted before the liberation showed more 
than 75 % illiteracy among the kamaiyas and their family members. Meanwhile, after 
emancipation, sample household survey in Banke and Bardiya districts shows 
improvement in the literacy rate of freed-kamaiyas. It reaches 98 % in age range 6-4 
years, and 48 % in age range 25-60 years. However, female literacy is significantly lower 
than male (Buddhi Ram, 2011: 96). 
Generally, each freed-kamaiya household has only one main breadwinner, the 
head of the household. Nepal has dominant patriarchal tradition that influence family 
structure. Female will most unlikely to be found as household head. In case of death of 
husband, illness, or divorce, the family will be very vulnerable as it loses the 
breadwinner. A 10-year-old girl who used to work as kamlahari in two different districts 
explained: 
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After my father’s death, mother cannot support four children. My mother then 
sent me to the master’s house with expectations that I could earn some money and 
attend school. 
Another ex-kamlahari informed me: 
My father died due to heart attack, so, I had to go to master’s house. My mother 
had to raise 3 kids.  She then sent me to master’s house when I was 11 years of 
age. (16-year-old girl) 
Given these conditions, it is reasonable to say that freed-kamaiyas faces high 
economic and physical vulnerability, and are socially excluded from economic 
development. Volatile income, food insecurity, landlessness, limited access to basic 
services, all will add up to create a situation in which the most vulnerable freed-kamaiya 
households may likely decide to let their children working. However, for bonded child 
labour practice to persist, households vulnerability is just one of the factor among others. 
In order to get better understanding, the next section will analyze the role of education in 
the freed-kamaiyas community. 
 
4.2.2 The Role of Education    
  
The relation between education and child labour has become clearer these days. 
Many literatures and researches highlights the possible role of education in breaking the 
vicious cycle of poverty. Through better education, children will likely to have better 
earning in the future. This section will examine the condition of education system in the 
mid- and far-west Terai of Nepal, and the situation of education attainment of freed-
kamaiyas and their children also their perception towards education.  
 As mentioned, the laws guarantee free primary education for all children in Nepal. 
However, there are various fees that parents have to pay in practice, for example, costs of 
teacher, books and uniforms. This most likely hinders school attainment for children from 
disadvantaged families. Moreover, availability of schools is also a problem in many areas. 
This is true particularly in the Terai region. Nepal’s Department of Education (2009) 
points out that this area which accounts for nearly 50 per cent of the country's population, 
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has only 30 per cent of total schools. As a result, there is considerable overcrowding in 
Terai schools. 
Furthermore, education facilities are also difficult to access. In the Terai, many 
schools are temporarily inaccessible due to flooding in the rainy season. Such difficult 
condition may then influence the quality of education in the school. UNDP (2009) 
highlights that the less accessible a school, the more likely that its overall environment 
will be less conducive to teaching–learning, teachers will be less qualified, and the school 
will remain open for fewer days. In addition, the school are frequently closed because of 
bandha (strikes) called by political parties and their sister organizations or armed groups. 
Consequently, it is reasonable to argue that all these impediments of schooling 
likely contribute to lower the demand for schooling from freed-kamaiya families. Their 
vulnerable household income may hardly afford additional expenses for schooling, such 
as, uniform, books or transport fees. Schooling might also be seen as the loss of income 
from child labour without immediate and intangible benefit for the families.  
 A slightly different situation was found during my field research in three districts 
in mid- and far-western Terai region, I found that freed-kamaiya families try to reconcile 
the need for additional income and education. Many former bonded child labourers were 
sent to work because the employers promised to send them to school. This might imply 
that freed-kamaiya parents have understood the importance of education. They saw the 
promise of education from the masters/employers as an opportunity for their children to 
enjoy schooling while earning income from the work of their children. This finding is also 
supported by Giri (2010) who found that freed-kamaiya parents appear to perceive 
education as important tool for uplifting their social status and enabling them to come out 
of poverty by challenging the existing stereotypes about their cultural and economic 
backwardness. 
However, in practice, the promise of schooling from the masters/employers seems 
to be an elusive dream. From the interview and discussion with rescued bonded child 
labourers only a few of them informed that they had chance to attend schooling.  A 16-
year-old girl was lucky enough to enjoy education while working as kamlahari. She said:  
I used to work as kamlahari in Kathmandu for 8 years. My masters treated me 
good and sent me to school. I used to have time for studying at home although I 
wasn't paid for my work.  
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Other rescued children have different experiences. Two ex-kamlaharis informed me:  
Their masters promised to send them to school but in the end the girls rarely 
attended school because of so many household works. (two ex-kamlaharis in 
Neulapur, Bardiya District) 
Another girl who used to work as kamlahari since she was 6 years old added: 
I used to do all the household works. Master used to give only food and clothes. 
Sometimes I got chance to go to school which made me very happy. 
From the interviews, it can also be inferred that many former bonded child 
labourers and children of freed-kamaiyas are aware of the importance of education. Many 
of them showed their enthusiasm of going back to school and encouragement for parents 
and other children to go to school.  
Parents should send their children to school. Children should go to school and 
learn many things. If they don't go to school, they have to work in their master's 
house in the future. So, everyone must go to school! (A 3rd grade primary school 
girl) 
Another girl added: 
This is the time for us to go school. If we don’t send children to school they have 
to live a life like kamaiya in the future. So, every child should go to school. (A 19-
year-old girl) 
Many of former bonded child labourers during my field research were catching up 
their education as they used to be working without getting the chance to study. A 12-year-
old ex-bonded child labourer who just got chance of schooling told me: 
I was 10 years old when an NGO rescued me from my master’s house. I was 
provided with 9 month non-formal basic course and was enrolled at 2nd grade in 
the school.  
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The awareness of freed-kamaiyas community on the importance of education can 
also be seen from sample survey which was conducted in Banke and Bardiya that children 
of freed-kamaiyas aged 6-14 years have high literacy rate and low school drop out in the 
primary level (Buddhi Ram, 2011). However, disparity in the enrolment rate between 
boys and girls is quite worrying (UNDP, 2009). This concern is shared by some children 
that I interviewed.  
Girls have to do all household works and don’t go to school. Parents send their 
son to school but ask their daughter do all the house hold works. (An 8th grade 
primary school girl) 
Another one added: 
There is discrimination between son and daughter in our families. Parents send 
their son to school but ask their daughter to carry out household works without 
sending them to school. Daughter does not get their right to read and write and 
enjoy their freedom. (An 8th grade primary school girl) 
Furthermore, school might also be the right place to monitor child labour practice. 
Teacher can play significant role in this scenario. A teacher in Banke district, who runs 
her own initiative in monitoring child labour in her community, informed me: 
I usually monitor children presence in the class. If I found any children absence 
from classes, I then checked their houses to find out any reasons, problems, or to 
see if parents sent their children to work. (Rama Paudel) 
 Awareness of the importance of education in the freed-kamaiyas community has 
been encouraging. Parents and children value education highly. However, the quality and 
quantity of education facilities, and the realization of free primary education still need a 
lot of improvement in order to provide equal access to education for all children. 
Moreover, many freed-kamaiya households involve in the annual contract with the 
employers because of the promise of education for the children. In reality, children hardly 
manage to work and to study at the same time, or even they are not allowed to attend 
schooling. In order to understand the reason behind the employers’ behaviour, the next 
chapter will discuss social acceptance and demand for child labour. 
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4.2.3 Social Acceptance of Child Labour 
  
In Nepali society, communal customs and familial interdependence play a 
significant part in the community. Bonded child labour practice clearly cannot be 
separated from this context. It, thus, essential to this study to understand how Nepali 
communal customs and family interdependence shape the society perception towards the 
kamaiya bonded child labour practice.  
The conception of childhood may vary in many societies. Doftori (2004: 68–9) 
argues that ‘Western children’ have their ‘own identity as social group’ whereas Nepali 
children do not have the same status as they are not recognized as ‘actors in their own 
rights’. Nepali children, on the other hand, are stuck with the ‘family childhoods’ derived 
from the community norms that basically deny their ‘autonomy and agency’. 
Consequently, dealing with this conception is a priority for national and international 
legislations to take effect on Nepali children. 
 As the globalisation has touched almost every corner of the world, different 
conception of childhood from other societies, particularly industrialized society, has 
gradually transferred to Nepal. Giri (2009) highlights that with the support from UN 
Universal Primary Education (UPE) campaign, more and more children, especially in 
urban settings, are embracing the possibility of enhancing their individual rights. As they 
start to spend more time at school than working with or for their families, their 
contribution to the household economy naturally decreases. However, children in the rural 
areas, generally, experience different condition.  
 In many Nepali rural areas, particularly in the poor families, children are an 
important part of the family, especially in a socio-cultural sense. They have a duty to be 
obedient and respectful to their elders and to take the responsibility to contribute to 
household maintenance (Giri, 2009: 606; de Groot, 2010). In the situation where no work 
means no food, work is considered as a shared responsibility of all household members to 
perform family duties by putting in maximum time and effort (Giri, 2009: 607). 
Moreover, work is also seen as the part of the maturation process in which children 
participate with peers and older relatives (Baker and Hinton in de Groot, 2010: 70)  
 This perception applies in the freed-kamaiyas community. Before the liberation, 
parents and children were bonded to the same landlord. They shared responsibilities in 
handling the work, parents usually dealt with agricultural work, and young boy took care 
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of animals, and daughter carried out household chores (see chapter 2). Since the ban of 
kamaiya system, various difficulties have been besetting their new lives as freed-
kamaiyas (see section 4.2.1.2). As a result, there seems to be a trend of adults entering the 
cities or migrating to India for labour, and children going to their parents’ former 
landlords or to a city dweller via a distant relative with the hope of contributing some 
household income (Giri, 2004). 
Although many freed-kamaiyas seem to have adopted the new conception of 
childhood that embrace schooling as an essential part of  child’s upbringing, the critical 
household condition is likely to trump all other concerns. In this scenario, some kamaiya 
children tend to understand while others cannot avoid it. However, children who are sent 
to work at a very early age are most likely to refuse. A 16-year-old former bonded child 
labourer, who was sent to work before her 10th birthday, told me: 
When my mother asked me to go to master’s house, I refused. I said that I want to 
go to school. My master then promised to send me to school but he never did. 
 Accepting the role of children as contributor to household welfare, Nepali society, 
in general, perceives child labour as unavoidable or even beneficial or charitable. 
Providing work for children, including, employing child labourers is, therefore, 
acceptable. ILO rapid assessment on child domestic labourers in Kathmandu (2001) 
reported that there was “…a widespread perception among the employers that they are 
benefactors, securing a better future for the (domestic child labourer). On all (domestic 
child labourer) households researched, the employers would tell the same story of how a 
child, lost and found, has now obtained a better life. 
 Furthermore, Gilligan (2003) argues that there is a considerable empirical 
evidence that many political, bureaucratic and non-governmental elites employ domestic 
child labourers (or have employed bonded child labourers). Some of the literature reports 
accusations of political and bureaucratic interference with the implementation of child 
labour laws, including trafficking. By the same token, a Tharu community leader that I 
interviewed supported the argument by saying: ... I am aware of many governmental 
officials who employ kamlaharis in their houses. This obviously may undermine the 
enforcement of the laws and the development of social movement against child labour. 
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 Lack of awareness and understanding of the laws is also part of the problem. 
Many parents do not realize that they are not allowed by the law to send children to work. 
Employers may likely deny the fact that their act contradicts with the laws.  
The acceptance of child labour in the society may further create demand for child 
labour. Regardless of the employers’ intention, employing child labour is always 
attractive, as children tend to be easier to deal with, uncomplaining, and undemanding, 
not to mention lower or no wage (Gilligan, 2003: 64). In the context of kamaiya bonded 
child labour, combination of parent’s vulnerability, employer’s and broker’s economic 
gain as well as justification of helping disadvantaged children may likely contribute to the 
persistence of the practice. In addition, the unregulated informal nature of the labour 
makes it difficult to monitor. 
 
4.3 The Interplay among Factors 
 
In analysing various factors that preserve the kamaiya bonded child labour 
practice, one could see how they interact one another. Each factor may fit in the supply 
side or demand side, however, some factors fit in both sides. The relations among them 
are often causal. 
Factors in the macro/meso level most likely affect other factors in the micro level. 
It can be seen on how poverty, legal and policy implementation, and social acceptance 
influence other factors in the micro level. These factors are also likely to play double role 
by creating supply and demand for child labour. 
In the supply side, the lack of legal and policy implementation in rehabilitating 
freed-kamaiyas has affected some of the most vulnerable freed-kamaiya households to 
resort to child labour. One of the reason is that many freed-kamaiya families have been 
experiencing difficult situations such as volatile income, landlessness, food insecurity 
limited access to basic services since the liberation. The inability of some freed-kamaiya 
households in absorbing socio-economic shocks and the absence of reliable social 
protection have pushed them into destitution. In addition, freed-kamaiyas’ effort to uplift 
their livelihood condition has likely hampered by widespread poverty and inequality in 
the region.  
Moreover, the false promise of free primary education have likely failed to create 
a condition where schooling can be the alternative to child labour. Freed-kamaiya 
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households struggle for their subsistence and hardly afford additional expense for 
schooling. The awareness of freed-kamaiya families about the importance of education, 
on the other hand, is likely being utilized by the employers to attract them to enter bonded 
child labour arrangement in which schooling is one of the offer. This may likely shape a 
promising image to the freed-kamaiya families that by entering this arrangement they can 
send their children to school while gaining additional income. In case of special 
circumstances; for example broken family, death, or illness of the breadwinner; entering 
bonded child labour arrangement may be seen as the chance to lessen family burden.  
However, in reality, children hardly manage to work and to study at the same time, or 
even are not allowed to attend schooling.  
Furthermore, social acceptance of child labour also has a role to supply child 
labour. Social norm dictates Nepali society to perceive children as contributor to 
household welfare, particularly during difficult times. It shape family perception of child 
labour as unavoidable, thus, recourse to child labour. 
In the demand side, social acceptance of child labour plays significant role in 
creating demand for child labour. Generally, employing child labour is deemed as 
charitable act in Nepali society. Besides the attractiveness of child labour—easier to deal 
with, uncomplaining, and undemanding, not to mention lower or no wage—permissive 
behaviour toward child labour may likely generate demand  for child labour. In addition, 
the lack of rigorous legal enforcement and awareness of the laws prohibiting such act 
have also worsen the situation. 
It is reasonable to argue that the interplay between supply and demand factors 
have resulted in preserving the kamaiya bonded child labour practice. The interplay 
suggests that addressing one or some factors is not enough, as they are interconnected one 
to another. It also re-emphasize the need for holistic approach, since for example, 
addressing the lack of legal and policy implementation is unlikely to succeed without 
shifting the perception of child labour in the society.   
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5. Conclusion 
 
The fact that the practice of kamaiya bonded child labour in the mid and far-
western Terai is still widely practiced a decade after the abolition of kamaiya system 
raises the essential question about what preserves the practice. This study is an attempt to 
understand the complex factors that contribute to the prevalent practice of kamaiya 
bonded child labour in the mid- and far-western Terai of Nepal. In doing so, I analysed 
relevant legal and policy responses, I also discussed socio-economic situation of freed-
kamaiya households. 
On the legal and policy sectors, the government’s commitment on addressing the 
issue of kamaiya bonded child labour is shown through various legal instruments and 
policy papers. However, they are not flawless. A considerable amount of inconsistencies 
can be found in the child labour and bonded labour legal framework. On top of that, the 
implementation remains a big challenge. Some issues, such as, lack of resources, 
weakness of institutional mechanisms that includes judicial system, and uneven 
distribution of programme interventions, not to mention widespread societal acceptance 
of the pertinent practices, have been heavily hampered the implementation. In addition, a 
decade long Maoist insurgency has also hampered the progress .  
On the socio-economic dimension, the existence of  bonded child labour practice 
in the freed-kamaiyas community suggests that it cannot be separated from the post-
liberation situation of freed-kamaiyas. Freed-kamaiya households are likely to suffer from 
widespread poverty and discrepancy in the country. The slow progress of freed-kamaiyas 
rehabilitation programme, among other reasons, has also contributed to their household 
vulnerability. More detailed analyses presented here have shown that the situation of 
volatile income, food insecurity, landlessness, and limited access to basic services most 
likely will create a situation in which the most vulnerable freed-kamaiya households 
resort to bonded child labour arrangement to get foodstuff, loans, and a piece of land to 
cultivate. 
Many freed-kamaiyas and their children appear to value education highly. This 
likely because they see education as a tool to come out of poverty and to achieve better 
social status. However, many freed-kamaiya households involve in the annual contract 
with the employers because of the promise of education for their children. In reality, 
children hardly manage to work and to study at the same time, or even they are not 
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allowed to attend schooling. Moreover, the quality and quantity of education facilities, 
and the realization of free primary education still need a lot of improvement in order to 
provide equal access to education for all children and to increase demand for education.  
Furthermore, there is a widespread acceptance of child labour practice. It derives 
from the perception of childhood and the role of a child in the family in Nepali society. 
Supporting family, particularly during difficult times, is regarded as a shared 
responsibility of all household members. By accepting the role of children as contributor 
to household welfare, Nepali society, in general, perceives child labour as unavoidable or 
even beneficial or charitable. This may likely create demand for child labour as 
employing child labour is always attractive—easier to deal with, uncomplaining, and 
undemanding, not to mention lower or no wage. In addition, the lack of awareness and 
understanding of the law is also part of the problem.  
All in all, the government efforts in liberating and rehabilitating former kamaiyas 
are plausible. Some interventions on bonded child labour issue are also promising. 
However, there are a lot left to do. The continuation of above mentioned factors are likely 
to preserve the kamaiya bonded child labour practice.  
Several studies, including this one, have tried to shed a light on the root causes of 
kamaiya bonded child labour issue. In this study, I have tried to apply a holistic approach 
to the issue by discussing legal, political, and socio-economic factors of the issue. I 
focused on governmental interventions. I included interviews and discussions with 
rescued children, peers, teachers, and community leaders to give insight on their 
experiences related to the issue. However, I also realized that the research sample 
represents a small number and limited geographic areas, therefore, it can only be 
generalized to address the research question in a certain extent. More studies are needed 
to have better understanding on wider societal factors in larger geographic areas. A 
thorough assessment of freed-kamaiyas’ livelihood situation is also necessary to 
determine further steps in addressing kamaiya bonded child labour issue. 
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Appendix 1 Map of Nepal 
(Source: http://www.mapsofworld.com/nepal/nepal
2012) 
 
 
Appendix 2 Questionnaire to Rescued Bonded Child Labourers & Peers
 
1. General background data
Age 
Sex 
Education 
2. Family Condition 
Household composition
Forms, source of family income
Division of labour within family
Informal support network in 
3. Labour activity of children
Work history 
Characteristics of employer
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community 
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Type of contract 
Form/amount of payment 
Task/responsibilities 
Who benefits from wage? 
Hours and conditions of work 
Attitude to work 
 
4. Education of the children 
School attendance before, after, and during employment 
Frequency of attendance in School 
Feeling about school 
 
5. Feelings about situation and self 
Perception of past, present and future 
Meaning of education 
Expectation and dream on the future 
 
Appendix 3 List of Interviewed Children  
 
Dang Dirstrict 
Sabi (10) Ara (18) Gane (16) Nirma (16) Sati (15) 
Sami (11) Basa (15) Subin (16) Yama (16)  
 
Bardiya District 
Atina (14)  Manji (11) Gati  Nirma (15)  
Atina (15) Sushi   Ranji  Astuti (12) 
 
Banke District 
Rati (16) Gena  Suni (16) Asmi (9)  
Bire   Lali  Shara (19) Sushi (13) 
 
Appendix 4 Interviewed Community Leaders and Teacher  
 
1. Dilli Bahadhur Chaudhary, Tharu Community Leader and Director of Backward 
Society Education (BASE) 
2. Birbal Chaudhary, Tharu Community Leader and Bardiya District Coordinator of 
BASE 
3. Rama Paudel, Teacher at a School in Kachnapur VDC, Banke District. 
